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AGENCIES RUNNING FROM AGENCY DISCRETION
J.B. RUHL* & KYLE ROBISCH**
ABSTRACT
Discretion is the root source of administrative agency power and
influence, but exercising discretion often requires agencies to undergo
costly and time-consuming predecision assessment programs, such
as under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA). Many federal agencies thus have argued
strenuously, and counter-intuitively, that they do not have discretion
over particular actions so as to avoid such predecision requirements.
Interest group litigation challenging such agency moves has led to a
new wave of jurisprudence exploring the dimensions of agency dis-
cretion. The emerging body of case law provides one of the most
robust, focused judicial examinations of the nature and scope of
agency discretion available in modern administrative law, but agen-
cy discretion aversion and the concerns it raises have gone largely
unaddressed in legal scholarship. And yet the discretion aversion
syndrome is primed only to expand as climate change implicates a
broadening span of agency programs as having environmental
impacts.
This Article is the first to comprehensively describe and assess the
discretion aversion trend and to extract what it has to say not only
about agencies, courts, and statutes, but also about agency discretion
in general. Part I describes the origins and features of the ESA and
NEPA assessment programs leading to agency discretion aversion.
* David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair in Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
** Associate, Venable LLP. This Article benefitted greatly from workshops conducted at
the Duke, Vanderbilt, and Richmond law schools, from comments on drafts by Eric Biber,
Robin Craig, Dave Markell, Jim Salzman, Noah Sachs, and Kevin Stack, and from research
and analysis provided by Vanderbilt law students Caroline Cecot (2014), Will Irvine (2016),
and Daniel Naydenov (2017). 
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Part II identifies the strategies agencies use to escape the ESA and
NEPA assessment programs by disclaiming discretion. Part III
probes institutional concerns for agencies, courts, and the statutes
that arise from the discretion aversion syndrome, including agency
gaming behavior, judicial conflicts regarding when nondiscretion
exists, and compromised statutory purposes. Before turning to so-
lutions, Part IV steps back to assess what questions the ESA and
NEPA nondiscretion case law raises for the conceptualization of
agency discretion writ large, identifying discretion’s “negative space”
as the source of tension between agencies and courts. Part V then
circles back to reexamine the ESA and NEPA nondiscretion doc-
trines, evaluating alternative measures to deflate agencies’ discretion
aversion impulse while promoting the statutes’ purposes. We con-
clude that the most effective reform will be to eliminate discretion as
the litmus test for the ESA and NEPA, replacing it with criteria more
responsive to the statutes’ twin purposes of improving agency
decisions and providing information to other political institutions
and the public.
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INTRODUCTION
The law may be said to give an agency discretion when under
clear facts the agency may make more than one choice. If, how-
ever, on undisputed facts the law permits only one choice, then
the agency is said to have no discretion.1
If only it were that simple.
Discretion is the root source of administrative agency power and
influence and thus a ubiquitous presence in the modern administra-
tive state.2 Agencies wield their statutorily delegated discretion
through rulemaking, adjudication, licensing, enforcement, and pol-
icy setting to choose what gets done and who wins and who loses.
Discretion also pays some incidental dividends for agencies: man-
damus is unavailable for agency actions that are discretionary; tort
liability does not lie against agencies exercising discretionary func-
tions or against agency officials exercising discretionary authority;
judicial review is unavailable for acts entirely committed by law to
agency discretion; and even acts not committed to agency discretion
in that absolute sense are usually reviewable only for abuse of
discretion.3 With all these benefits flowing from the power to exer-
cise discretion, one might reasonably assume that agencies soak
discretion up like sponges and that it takes a hard squeeze for them
to give back even a drop.
So why in 2013 did the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—the agen-
cy responsible for building and maintaining much of the nation’s
water resources infrastructure—loudly proclaim that it possesses
not a scintilla of discretion over carrying out “the responsibility to
maintain Civil Works structures so that they continue to serve their
1. John M. Rogers, A Fresh Look at Agency “Discretion,” 57 TUL. L. REV. 776, 777 (1983).
2. For classic assessments of the role and ubiquity of agency discretion in the modern
administrative state, see generally Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative
Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 469 (1986); Rogers, supra note 1; Edward L. Rubin, Dis-
cretion and Its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1299 (1997); Martin Shapiro, Administrative
Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487 (1983). The seminal work is KENNETH CULP
DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
3. For a brief review of these doctrines see infra Part I. They are thoroughly examined
in Rogers, supra note 1. Moreover, these are just the tip of the iceberg of the practical reasons
why agencies value discretion. For more on the subject, see generally JAMES Q. WILSON,
BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989).
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congressionally authorized purposes”?4 That is a lot of authority for
an agency to squeeze out of its discretion sponge. Yet the Corps is
not alone in aggressively eschewing discretion, as the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, Navy, Bureau of Land Management,
Interstate Commerce Commission, Department of Agriculture,
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Bureau of Reclamation,
Coast Guard, and a host of other federal agencies have also insisted
they have no or limited discretion over particular actions within
their jurisdiction.5 Although some of the actions for which agencies
have disavowed discretion are admittedly mundane, such as small-
scale land exchanges, others lie at or near the core of vast agency
regulatory domains, including issuing national flood insurance,
approving mining on public lands, regulating pesticides, approving
federal delegation of pollution control programs to states, operating
major dam systems, and allocating irrigation water in the arid
West.6
What is leading these and other federal agencies to run from
agency discretion? One possible explanation is that the agencies are
hoping to avoid the political heat that comes with the power to
decide. At one time, for example, the EPA, for largely political
reasons, took the position that it had no discretion to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act, a position the
Supreme Court rejected—albeit by a narrow majority.7 But shying
away from hard politics is not what is behind the wave of discretion
aversion that led the Corps to shed maintaining water resources
infrastructure from its inventory of discretionary functions. Rather,
discretion comes with plenty of process baggage in the modern
administrative state. In a broad range of settings, when agencies
exercise discretion, they also must jump through procedural and
substantive hoops requiring them to produce a litany of studies and
findings before moving forward with a final decision about how to
exercise their discretion, and even then they face rounds of litigation
4. See Memorandum from Earl H. Stockdale, Chief Counsel, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
to All Counsel 2-3 (June 11, 2013), http://planning.usace.army.mil/toolbox/library/Memosand
Letters/13Jun11-ESA.pdf [https://perma.cc/TU39-GQWN] [hereinafter Chief Counsel Memor-
andum].
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part II.
7. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
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over whether they jumped through the hoops the right way.8 The
perverse “ossification” effects of these decision-making prerequi-
sites on agency behavior have been well documented and debated in
legal scholarship.9 What is taking on an increasingly larger, and
surprising, role in this dynamic is that agencies now think twice
about claiming discretion at all, even going so far in many contexts
as to actively claim nondiscretion over a particular action or class of
actions.10
A primary driver behind this form of discretion aversion has been
the combined effect of two environmental laws: the Endangered
Species Act (the ESA)11 and the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).12 Section 7 of the ESA requires federal agencies to consult
with the Secretaries of the Departments of Interior and Commerce
to ensure actions they carry out, fund, or authorize do not jeopardize
8. See Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2014).
9. See, e.g., William S. Jordan III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious
Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Infor-
mal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 393-95 (2000) (pointing out criticisms that hard look
review has ossified the informal rulemaking process); Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative
Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1671 (2012)
(noting that “regulated industries, and occasionally beneficiary groups, are willing to spend
millions of dollars to shape public opinion and influence powerful political actors to exert pol-
itical pressure on agencies”); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385 (1992) (noting that the informal “rulemaking
process has become increasingly rigid and burdensome”); Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the
Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 100-45 (2003) (pro-
viding a broad critique of the public participation and judicial review model of administrative
law); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify
Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 483-89 (1997)
(discussing criticisms that the informal rulemaking process has become “unnecessarily cum-
bersome”); Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique
of Judicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 251-52 (2009) (surveying and assessing the extensive
body of legal scholarship on agency ossification).
10. For other accounts of agency avoidance behavior designed to buffer against the
procedural burdens of administrative decision-making processes, see Nina A. Mendelson &
Jonathan B. Wiener, Responding to Agency Avoidance of OIRA, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
447, 448-49 (2014); Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN. L.
REV. 65, 68 (2015). In neither of these other contexts does the avoidance strategy involve the
extreme step of the agency disavowing discretion.
11. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012). We follow the convention among environmental
lawyers of referring to the Endangered Species Act as “the ESA.”
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2012). We follow the convention among environmental
lawyers of referring to the National Environmental Policy Act as simply “NEPA,” without the
preceding definite article. 
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the continued existence of species designated under the ESA as
endangered or threatened.13 NEPA requires federal agencies to
prepare statements assessing the environmental impacts of their
proposed actions.14 Often applying to agency decisions in tandem,
these two processes impose costly and time-consuming impact as-
sessment procedures, ensnare agencies in potentially years of
litigation over the adequacy of their assessments, and in practical
effect can substantially alter an agency’s proposed action, if not flat-
out kill it.15
But there is a way out of the ESA and NEPA assessment re-
quirements for agencies: pursuant to judicial and administrative
interpretations, the two programs do not apply to actions over which
an agency has no discretion.16 Indeed, since the Supreme Court’s
2007 decision in National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of
Wildlife, in which the Court upheld an administrative policy that
agency discretion over an action is necessary to trigger ESA
consultation requirements,17 agencies have been aggressively
attempting to wiggle out of ESA and NEPA assessment require-
ments by claiming nondiscretion.18 The Corps’s declaration of non-
discretion over maintaining its water infrastructure projects, for
example, was made in the context of a policy statement regarding
the agency’s approach to ESA section 7 consultations.19
This phenomenon is far from a trivial niche problem of environ-
mental law. The scope of the ESA and NEPA is immense—they
capture all actions federal agencies authorize, fund, or carry out.
The only thing trivial is what is not swept into that space. And as
climate change pulls more and more agency programs into the
realm of affecting the environment,20 the ESA and NEPA will only
grow in reach. Agencies, particularly those new to the ESA and
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). For a fuller description, see infra Part I.A.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). For a fuller description, see infra Part I.B.
15. See Denis Binder, NEPA, NIMBYs and New Technology, 25 LAND & WATER L. REV.
11, 16-17 (1990).
16. See infra Part II.
17. 551 U.S. 644, 666-69 (2007).
18. See infra Part II.
19. See Chief Counsel Memorandum, supra note 4, at 1.
20. See Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of
Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 214-17 (2014).
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NEPA, are likely to evaluate whether and how to take advantage of
the ESA and NEPA nondiscretion exemptions.
To evaluate the scope and impact of this agency discretion aver-
sion trend, we analyzed all reported judicial decisions in which the
court ruled on an agency’s ESA or NEPA nondiscretion claim. From
this rapidly expanding body of case law, we identified four distinct
strategies agencies use for asserting nondiscretion to avoid the ESA
and NEPA.21 One is to claim that any discretion that may have
existed over a given matter has expired, which means the agency no
longer has authority to take an action that would trigger the ESA
and NEPA.22 Another position is that, while the agency might hold
some ongoing discretion over a matter in the background, it is
proposing no action that would require exercising that discretion at
the moment and thus has not triggered the ESA and NEPA.23 The
third strategy is for an agency to concede it has discretion over an
action and plans to exercise it, but to describe its discretion as
sharply cabined such that the agency cannot act to fulfill the
purposes of the ESA and NEPA, thus purportedly rendering the
assessment procedures pointless.24 The fourth approach is for the
agency to claim it has a mandatory duty to act in a prescribed
manner and that ESA and NEPA assessment would be irrelevant to,
or even impermissibly contrary to, fulfilling that mandate.25 If
successful in any of these arguments, agencies hope they can go
about their business unbothered by the ESA and NEPA assessment
programs.
To be clear, we are not proposing that agencies should overreach
in their claims of discretion. If an agency’s discretion over a matter
is unambiguously bounded, limited, or does not exist at all, the
agency should say so. But agencies should also not underclaim their
discretion if merely utilized as a strategy to avoid the burdens of
decision-making. The proliferation of agency nondiscretion claims
raises a red flag in that regard. Indeed, we identified three institu-
21. See infra Part II. 
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. See infra Part II.B.
24. See infra Part II.C.
25. See infra Part II.D.
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tional concerns arising from the rising trend of agencies running
from agency discretion to avoid running into the ESA and NEPA.26
The first concern is that agencies will attempt to game their ESA
and NEPA nondiscretion positions to have the best of all worlds:
discretion where and when they want it and nondiscretion for pur-
poses of escaping the ESA and NEPA programs.27 Such gaming
behavior puts pressure on the conventional model that agency
discretion over an action falls neatly into one of three mutually
exclusive buckets: (1) no authority over the action; (2) discretion
over the action; or (3) mandatory duty to act a certain way with
regard to the action.28 In effect, agencies are searching for a fourth
state of discretion—one that costs them nothing but gets them out
of the ESA and NEPA. Of course, agency watchdogs and courts
could detect when an agency explicitly takes inconsistent positions
about the presence of discretion over an action for different dis-
cretion-based doctrines. But agencies might attempt to game the
system more subtly, such as by subdividing actions into discretion-
ary and nondiscretionary components separated by fuzzy lines or by
hiding the true exercise of discretion behind what they portray as a
nondiscretionary mandate. Our analysis of the case law finds ample
evidence that agencies engage in such gaming behavior.29
The second concern has to do with how courts are to evaluate
agency claims of nondiscretion. When an agency claims not to have
discretion, the question for the court is whether the relevant statute
or other authority extends more power than the agency purports to
be able to exercise.30 The agency is trying to prove a negative—lack
of discretion—and the court must ask whether more can be extrac-
ted from the agency’s statutory or other governing authority. That
inquiry requires the court to hypothesize the positive—presence of
discretion—in a context where the agency insists it has none and
has structured its rules and behavior around that position. This role
has proven difficult for courts to assume, as it requires the court,
not the agency, to think like an agency would if attempting to
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Part III.A.
28. See infra Part III.A.
29. See infra Part III.A.
30. See infra Part III.B.
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maximize its claim of discretion.31 The result has been that, not-
withstanding broad judicial adoption of what on the surface appear
to be clear tests for weighing agency nondiscretion claims, courts
have been in turmoil over how to apply them and the outcomes defy
any coherent synthesis.32 Indeed, the issue has recently come to a
boil and sharply divided judges on the Ninth Circuit.33
A third concern has to do with whether the mounting number of
successful discretion aversion claims has begun to chip away at the
underlying purposes of the ESA and NEPA. While it is true that
both statutes are designed to improve agency decision-making by
increasing information available to the agency, both are also de-
signed to inform the public and other institutions about the effects
of agency actions.34 Relieving agencies of ESA and NEPA assess-
ment procedures when they have no discretion relevant to the
decision-improvement purpose arguably makes sense from the
standpoint of agency decision-making; however, doing so may
undesirably compromise the information-production functions of the
two programs for other institutions and the public and thereby
impair their decision-making.35
In addition to these institutional concerns, the perverse effects
the discretion aversion trend is having on agencies, courts, and the
statutes raise challenging questions regarding the very concept of
discretion in administrative law. Although agencies and courts in
the ESA and NEPA nondiscretion cases purport to treat agency
discretion as a binary state—it either exists or not36—more ques-
tions are raised than answered by the courts’ application of this
simple conception of discretion. When does agency discretion begin,
and when does it end for good? What is the effect of an agency
having the discretion to decide whether and when to exercise
discretion? What if an agency elects to limit its discretion through
contract, permit terms, or other bilateral instruments? What, be-
yond enforcement discretion, is required before an agency can be
31. See infra Part III.B.
32. See infra Part III.B.
33. See Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell, 811 F.3d 1111, 1112 (9th Cir. 2015) (Gould,
J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
34. See infra Part III.C.
35. See infra Part III.C.
36. See infra Part III.B.
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said to have ongoing discretion over a matter? What effect does a
“shall” mandate have on agency discretion if the mandate is trig-
gered only when the agency makes discretionary findings? These
and similar puzzling aspects of the ESA and NEPA nondiscretion
case law reveal an untapped realm of potential discretionary power
not exercised by the agency—what we call discretion’s negative
space—the temporal, spatial, and institutional dimensions of which
confound binary conceptions of agency discretion. Ultimately, the
core question boils down to which institution defines that negative
space: agencies or courts.
The body of ESA and NEPA case law on agency nondiscretion
claims provides one of the most robust, focused judicial exami-
nations of the nature and scope of agency discretion available in
modern administrative law, yet it and the questions and concerns
it raises have gone largely unaddressed in legal scholarship. What
makes these cases a dataset of particular interest is the unusual
perspective agencies take of disavowing, rather than claiming,
discretion. Although the sources, contours, and consequences of
agency discretion have been core themes of legal scholarship for
decades,37 the ESA and NEPA discretion aversion trend has built
steam while remaining below the radar screen of close scholarly
assessment. In legal commentary, the trend has been picked up only
through the lens of assessing its effects on the implementation of
the ESA and NEPA, not its effects on how agencies manage their
discretion or, more broadly, how it informs conceptions of the nature
and scope of agency discretion writ large.38 And yet the discretion
37. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 1, at 777.
38. See Steven G. Davison, Federal Agency Action Subject to Section 7(a)(2) of the En-
dangered Species Act, 14 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 29, 63 (2006); Jan Hasselman, Holes in
the Endangered Species Act Safety Net: The Role of Agency “Discretion” in Section 7 Consul-
tation, 25 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 126 (2006); Linus Chen, National Association of Home
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife and the Meaning of Agency “Discretion,” 38 ENVTL. L. REP.
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,039, 10,043 (2008); Kyle Robisch, The NEPA Implied Exemption Doc-
trine: How a Novel and Creeping Common Law Exemption Threatens to Undermine the
National Environmental Policy Act, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 173, 175 (2014); Katharine Mapes,
Case Comment, National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 32 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 263, 270 (2008); Kristen M. Quaresimo, Comment, Endangering the Endan-
gered Species Act: National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife and Its
Threat to the Survival of Endangered Species Protection, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2009);
Derek Weller, Note, Limiting the Scope of the Endangered Species Act: Discretionary Federal
Involvement or Control Under Section 402.03, 5 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. &  POL’Y 309,
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aversion syndrome is primed only to expand as climate change
implicates a broadening span of agency programs as having envi-
ronmental impacts and thus forces more and more agencies to face
the prospect of having to undergo the ESA and NEPA assessments.
This Article is the first to comprehensively piece together the
ESA and NEPA discretion aversion trend to probe those questions
and concerns. The discussion proceeds in five parts. Part I describes
the origins and features of the ESA and NEPA assessment pro-
grams leading to agency discretion aversion. Part II identifies the
strategies agencies use to escape the ESA and NEPA assessment
programs by disclaiming discretion. Part III examines the institu-
tional concerns for agencies, courts, and the statutes (and by
extension, Congress) that arise from the discretion aversion syn-
drome. Before turning to solutions tailored to the ESA and NEPA,
Part IV steps back to assess what questions the ESA and NEPA
nondiscretion case law raises for the conceptualization of agency
discretion writ large, identifying discretion’s negative space as the
source of tension between agencies and courts. With that broader
context in place, Part V then reexamines the ESA and NEPA non-
discretion doctrines and evaluates alternative measures to deflate
agencies’ discretion aversion impulse while promoting the statutes’
purposes. We conclude that the most effective reform will be to
eliminate discretion as the litmus test for the ESA and NEPA,
replacing it with criteria more responsive to the statutes’ twin
purposes of improving agency decisions and providing information
to other political institutions and the public.
I. THE SOURCES OF AGENCY DISCRETION AVERSION
Agency discretion is the oil that keeps the administrative state
running.39 Each year, for example, hundreds of federal, state, and
314, 319 (1999). Several authors discussing Home Builders soon after it was decided suggested
that the case could spawn agency nondiscretion claims and clutter the law of agency discre-
tion, but did not undertake a comprehensive assessment of the case law in either respect. See
Chen, supra, at 10,039, 10,056; Mapes, supra, at 263, 272-73; see also Robisch, supra, at 198-
205 (discussing the potential effect of Home Builders on NEPA nondiscretion cases).
39. See Koch, supra note 2, at 469 (“Administrative law is dominated by the term discre-
tion.”); Rogers, supra note 1, at 776 (“Lawyers who represent or litigate against government
agencies must wrestle so frequently with the concept of agency ‘discretion.’”); Rubin, supra
note 2, at 1299 (“The ubiquity of discretion in the implementation process is now widely
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local agencies exercise legislatively delegated discretion under hun-
dreds of statutes to issue tens of thousands of permits, licenses, and
other forms of permission for individuals and businesses to engage
in otherwise statutorily proscribed activities.40 On the other hand,
agencies also carry out a multitude of functions over which they
have no discretion, merely serving as ministerial agents of legisla-
tures.
Because agency exercise of discretion often decides winners and
losers, agencies inevitably take heat for their discretionary acts.
Agencies also occasionally make mistakes in exercising discretion
and could be exposed to liability for injuries caused to other par-
ties.41 A number of doctrines, some ages old, have developed to
insulate agencies from these consequences.42 Chief among them are
mandamus, tort immunity, officer immunity, and deferential judi-
cial review.43 Each plays its role in the administrative state, and an
agency’s status under each depends on whether the agency is exer-
cising discretion.44
Discretion is not invariably a good thing for agencies, however.
For example, section 7 of the ESA and NEPA both apply to actions
federal agencies carry out, fund, or authorize, which covers a lot of
territory.45 Although both programs include mechanisms for avoid-
ing or truncating assessments for what are obviously no-impact or
low-impact actions,46 many federal agency actions nonetheless trig-
ger the requirements to engage in thorough assessment of impacts
to species protected under the ESA, to prepare a comprehensive
assessment of environmental impacts under NEPA, or to comply
with both programs. Yet both programs also have evolved so as to
provide exceptions for nondiscretionary actions, the history and
details of which this Part examines.
recognized.”).
40. See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 20, at 140.
41. See Rogers, supra note 1, at 776.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See generally id.
45. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012).
46. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2015) (stating that low-impact actions may be categorically
excluded from NEPA assessment); 50 C.F.R. § 402.13 (2015) (stating that a finding of “not
likely to adversely affect” terminates the ESA consultation process).
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A. The Endangered Species Act
Widely regarded as the “pit bull” of environmental laws,47 the
central purpose of the ESA is to “provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved.”48 The agencies delegated to administer
the ESA, the United States Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) for the
Department of the Interior and the National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vice (NMFS) for the Department of Commerce,49 have authority over
several core programs aimed toward that objective:
• The Listing Programs. Known as the listing function, sec-
tion 4 authorizes the agencies to identify “endangered” and
“threatened” species,50 to designate a “critical habitat,”51 and
to develop a “recovery plan[ ]”52 for each listed species.
• Interagency Consultations. Section 7 requires all federal
agencies, using the “best scientific and commercial data
available” and “in consultation with” the FWS or NMFS
(depending on the species), to “insure” that actions they car-
ry out, fund, or authorize do not “jeopardize” the continued
47. Steven P. Quarles, The Pit Bull Goes to School, ENVTL. F., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 55, 55
(discussing the origins of this reputation); see also Steven P. Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist,
The Pronounced Presence and Insistent Issues of the ESA, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 59, 59
(2001) (giving additional historical context to highlight the ESA’s “overbearing statutory
certainty”).
48. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
49. The FWS administers the ESA for all terrestrial, freshwater, and certain other speci-
fied species, and the NMFS administers the ESA for most marine species and anadromous
fish. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (sharing administration between the two agencies).
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1); see LAWRENCE R. LIEBESMAN & RAFE PETERSEN, ENDANGERED
SPECIES DESKBOOK 13-27 (2d ed. 2010) (describing the listing process); J.B. Ruhl, Listing
Endangered and Threatened Species, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND
PERSPECTIVES 16, 17-35 (Donald C. Baur & Wm. Robert Irvin eds., 2d ed. 2010).
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3); see LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 50, at 29-34 (describing
the critical habitat designation process); Federico Cheever, Critical Habitat, in ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 50, at 40, 41-69 (same); Murray D.
Feldman & Michael J. Brennan, The Growing Importance of Critical Habitat for Species
Conservation, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 88, 88 (2001) (describing the history of critical
habitat designation).
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f); see LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 50, at 35-38 (describing
the recovery plan process); Dale D. Goble, Recovery, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW,
POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 50, at 70, 71-103 (same).
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existence of listed species or result in “adverse modification”
of their critical habitat.53
• The Take Prohibition. Section 9 requires that all persons,
including all private and public entities subject to federal
jurisdiction, avoid committing “take” of listed endangered
species of fish and wildlife.54 The statute defines “take” to
include “harm,”55 which the FWS and NMFS have defined to
include significant modification of habitat leading to actual
death or injury of protected species.56
• Incidental Take Authorization. Sections 7 (for federal agency
direct, funding, and approval actions)57 and 10 (for actions
not subject to section 7)58 establish the procedures and
criteria for the FWS and NMFS to approve “incidental take”
of listed species.59
Consultation under section 7 involves a multi-step process in which
the “action agency” (the agency proposing the action) and the
“consulting agency” (the FWS or NMFS) exchange information and
reports about the impacts of the action on listed species.60 The
process, laid out in regulations the FWS and NMFS have jointly
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); see LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 50, at 29-38 (describing
the consultation process); Patrick W. Ryan & Erika E. Malmen, Interagency Consultation
Under Section 7, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note
50, at 104, 105-25 (same). 
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)-(C); see LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 50, at 63-72
(describing the cases developing the legal standards for what constitutes “take”); Steven P.
Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist, Land Use Activities and the Section 9 Take Prohibition, in
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 50, at 160, 161-68
(same). 
55. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
56. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2015) (providing the FWS definition of harm); id. § 222.102 (pro-
viding the NMFS definition of harm). Most of the regulatory weight of the ESA comes through
the agencies’ interpretation of harm and its application to land development and natural re-
sources extraction. See Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 54, at 161-68. 
57. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4). Permits under this provision are known as “incidental take
statements.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i).
58. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1). Permits under this provision are known as “incidental take
permits,” but they require applicant submission of a “habitat conservation plan” and thus are
also referred to as “HCP permits.” See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 20, at 174.
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1). Although “incidental take” is not explicitly defined in a specific
statutory provision, it is described in section 10 of the statute as take that is “incidental to,
and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.” Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
60. See id. § 1536.
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promulgated,61 can take well over a year and can result in the con-
sulting agency imposing conditions on the action that are, for all
practical purposes, binding on the action agency.62 Despite efforts by
the FWS, NMFS, and other agencies to reduce these time and
resource burdens, in 2004, the General Accounting Office (now the
Government Accountability Office) found that federal officials and
nonfederal parties still had extensive concerns about the consulta-
tion process.63
To be sure, the joint FWS and NMFS regulations governing
consultations take some pressure off the cost and time associated
with consulting by allowing agencies to exit the process early and
with less assessment burden upon finding the action is “not likely
to adversely affect” a protected species.64 But there is another way
around the section 7 quagmire: placed prominently at their be-
ginning, the joint regulations provide that “[s]ection 7 and the
requirements of this part apply to all actions in which there is
discretionary Federal involvement or control.”65 By implication,
consultation requirements do not apply to actions over which there
is not discretionary federal involvement or control. This “discretion-
ary involvement or control” requirement, however, does not appear
in the text or legislative history of the ESA, nor did it appear in the
proposed consultation regulations the FWS and NMFS published in
1983, which applied the consultation process to all instances of fed-
eral “involvement or control.”66 Rather, the qualification that the
action agency must have discretion with respect to its “involvement
and control” for section 7 consultation to apply appeared for the first
time, out of the blue, in the 1986 final promulgated regulations,
without a word of explanation for the change.67
61. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.
62. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169-71 (1997).
63. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-93, ENDANGERED SPECIES: MORE FEDERAL
MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IS NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE CONSULTATION PROCESS 4-5 (2004).
64. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.13.
65. See id. § 402.03.
66. See Weller, supra note 38, at 323-25 (recounting the regulatory history and arguing
that the final rule was not a logical extension of the proposed rule, lacked adequate explan-
ation, and was contrary to the statute).
67. Id.; see also Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 679-83
(2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining the regulatory history of section 7). 
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Nevertheless, in 2007 the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,
upheld the regulation and the agencies’ implementation in the
Home Builders case, ruling that “this interpretation is reasonable
in light of the statute’s text and the overall statutory scheme, and
... it is therefore entitled to deference under Chevron.”68 The maj-
ority’s rationale emphasized how futile it would be to make agencies
with no discretion nonetheless complete the ESA consultation pro-
cess: “The regulation’s focus on ‘discretionary’ actions accords with
the commonsense conclusion that, when an agency is required to do
something by statute, it simply lacks the power to ‘insure’ that such
action will not jeopardize endangered species.”69
The lower courts had long been on board with that reasoning. For
example, the Ninth Circuit has never questioned the validity of the
regulatory exemption and has over time crafted a test requiring that
the agency engage in consultation only if its statutory authority
gives it “any discretion to act in a manner beneficial to a protected
species or its habitat.”70 Under this test, it need not be shown that
the agency must act for the benefit of the species, only that it could
in some degree do so.71 Thus, “[t]he agency lacks discretion only if
another legal obligation makes it impossible for the agency to
exercise discretion for the protected species’ benefit.”72 The Supreme
Court in Home Builders adopted basically the same test, holding
that the consultation duty “covers only discretionary agency actions
and does not attach to actions ... that an agency is required by
statute to undertake once certain specified triggering events have
occurred.”73 In short, lack of discretion is an agency’s ticket out of
ESA section 7 consultation.
68. Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 666 (majority opinion).
69. Id. at 667.
70. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Jewell, 749 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 669. The Court rejected the argument that the ESA
explicitly or impliedly preempts other statutes defining nondiscretionary duties by adding an
independent consultation requirement for listed species. Id. at 664.
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B. The National Environmental Policy Act
When Congress enacted NEPA in 1969, it intended the legislation
to be applied broadly.74 NEPA’s text forces agencies to consider the
environmental impacts of all “major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment,”75 which encom-
passes a wide universe of federal agency activity. And not only does
NEPA cast a wide shadow, it imposes sizable reporting and analysis
duties on agency actions that fall within its ambit. Agencies often
must prepare an environmental assessment—which can be dozens
of pages long76—to decide whether to generate a full-blown environ-
mental impact statement (EIS)—which often number hundreds of
pages77—all while navigating a complex maze of agency regulations
promulgated by the White House Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ)78 and subjecting each document to a lengthy period of public
comment.79 In short, even accepting the wisdom and efficacy of
NEPA, the statute undoubtedly demands much of the many federal
agencies charged with adhering to it.
So, if NEPA is both broad in its applicability and bulky in its
procedural mandates, it would seem to follow that the statute leaves
agencies little wiggle room when it comes to compliance. However,
the courts have complicated matters considerably by creating an
implied nondiscretion exemption. Instead of taking NEPA’s text at
its face and simply requiring agencies to engage in NEPA’s proce-
dural process for all “major Federal actions significantly affecting
74. See Charles J. Gartland, At War and Peace with the National Environmental Policy
Act: When Political Questions and the Environment Collide, 68 A.F. L. REV. 27, 30-31 (2012)
(“[NEPA’s] language paints broad brush strokes of policy instead of detailed technical
prescriptions. There is no limit or requirement to curtail specific pollution or activities of any
kind—no micrograms per liter, parts per million, or other such limitations found in
environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act.” (footnotes omitted)).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012).
76. See CHARLES H. ECCLESTON, NEPA AND ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING: TOOLS,
TECHNIQUES, AND APPROACHES FOR PRACTITIONERS 76-77 (2008).
77. See id. at 77.
78. NEPA established the CEQ, an agency in the Executive Office of the President, to
promulgate regulations that would effectuate NEPA’s requirements. See Council on Envtl.
Quality, The Council on Environmental Quality - About, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.white
house.gov/administration/eop/ceq/about [https://perma.cc/FX6G-YREE]. These regulations
contain a bevy of specific definitions, requirements, and guidance for agencies tasked with
complying with NEPA. See 40 C.F.R. § 1507 (2015).
79. See id. § 1506.6.
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the quality of the human environment,”80 courts allow agencies to
argue that certain actions are “nondiscretionary” and therefore
outside the scope of NEPA.81 To be sure, there are instances where
Congress unambiguously intended certain classes of agency actions
or specific agency projects to be exempt from NEPA, even if they can
be appropriately classified as “major” and “significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment.”82 But the implied nondiscretion
exemption is entirely a product of judicial and agency craftsman-
ship; nothing in NEPA’s text explicitly allows agencies to avoid it
when their action is nondiscretionary.83
The NEPA implied exemption doctrine can be traced back forty
years to Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n of
Oklahoma, in which the Supreme Court considered an appeal by the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from
a Tenth Circuit decision involving the the Interstate Land Sales
Full Disclosure Act (Disclosure Act).84 The Tenth Circuit affirmed an
injunction against HUD that disallowed the approval of several
disclosure statements from housing developers under the Disclosure
Act until the agency prepared an EIS.85 On its appeal to the
Supreme Court, the government provided two legal theories as to
why HUD had been exempted from producing an EIS due to the
requirements of the Disclosure Act.86 Both of the government’s
distinct arguments were intended to limit NEPA’s applicability and
relied on the ability of a statute to create an implied exemption to
NEPA.87
The government based one argument on compliance and argued
that it was impossible to comply with both the Disclosure Act’s
requirement to approve disclosure statements within thirty days of
issuance and NEPA’s requirement to produce an EIS before under-
taking that same action.88 Therefore, if HUD’s approval of disclosure
80. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
81. See Robisch, supra note 38, at 186-87.
82. See id. at 180-81 & nn.44-48.
83. See id. at 182-85.
84. 426 U.S. 776, 783-85 (1976). For an in-depth discussion of the Flint Ridge case, see
Robisch, supra note 38, at 182-85.
85. Flint Ridge Dev. Co., 426 U.S. at 783-84.
86. See id. at 785-86.
87. See id. at 786-87.
88. See id. at 787.
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statements were to fall within the scope of NEPA as a “major
federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment,”89 then the agency would be forced to run afoul of
either the Disclosure Act (because creating an EIS inevitably takes
longer than thirty days) or NEPA (by declining to generate an
EIS).90
The government’s other argument was similarly grounded in the
idea of an implied exemption to NEPA, but it focused on characteriz-
ing the inherent nature of the agency action as nondiscretionary
instead of the impossibility of compliance.91 This argument asked
the Court to examine the agency action in a vacuum, looking only to
NEPA and not to any other statutory obligations.92 The government
asked the Court to decide that NEPA could be inapplicable when an
agency “by statute, has no power to take environmental conse-
quences into account in deciding” whether to undertake an action.93
Put simply, the government argued that HUD was not subject to
NEPA’s requirements, because HUD could not exercise any
discretion in discharging its Disclosure Act duties, as the statute’s
language compelled the agency to approve disclosure statements
within thirty days.94
To support this argument, the government claimed that “NEPA
is concerned only with introducing environmental considerations
into the decision-making processes of agencies that have the ability
to react to environmental consequences when taking action.”95 Put
otherwise, if an agency’s course was predetermined, then no
measure of harmful environmental impacts could alter the agency’s
course of action. The respondents countered by noting:
[E]ven if the agency taking action is itself powerless to protect
the environment, preparation and circulation of an impact
statement serves the valuable function of bringing the environ-
mental consequences of federal actions to the attention of those
89. Id.
90. See Robisch, supra note 38, at 183.
91. See Flint Ridge Dev. Co., 426 U.S. at 786.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 786.
94. Id. at 787.
95. Id. at 786 (emphasis added).
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who are empowered to do something about them—other federal
agencies, Congress, state agencies, or even private parties.96
The two arguments thus juxtaposed NEPA’s twin purposes of im-
proving agency decision-making and providing information about
agency actions to the public.
In the end, Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court accepted the
government’s impossibility of compliance argument, that “where a
clear and unavoidable conflict in statutory authority exists, NEPA
must give way,” finding that this was the case under HUD’s
statute.97 Because the Court resolved the case on this basis, it
expressly reserved the question of whether an agency undertaking
a nondiscretionary action must comply with NEPA.98 While at least
one prominent commentator has portrayed this outcome as a victory
for environmentalists,99 the dominant view has been that Flint
Ridge ushered in a long line of Supreme Court cases antagonistic to
NEPA’s environmental protection goals.100 In either case, since Flint
Ridge, agencies have continued to advance the nondiscretion
implied exemption position.101 While the government at first ex-
perienced some pushback from a few courts,102 over time the circuits
almost uniformly coalesced around the Department of Justice’s
interpretation that NEPA does not apply to nondiscretionary agency
actions. As a result, most (if not all) circuits now recognize an
96. Id. at 786-87.
97. Id. at 788. 
98. See id. at 787 (“Because we reject this argument of respondents and find that
preparation of an impact statement is inconsistent with the Secretary’s mandatory duties
under the Disclosure Act, we need not resolve petitioners’ first contention.”).
99. See Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme
Court: A Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 GEO. L.J. 1507, 1539 (2012). 
100. See, e.g., William H. Rodgers, Jr., NEPA at Twenty: Mimicry and Recruitment in
Environmental Law, 20 ENVTL. L. 485, 497 (1990); Marla A. Weiner, Comment, Flint Ridge
Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association: Limiting the Applicability of NEPA, 13 URB.
L. ANN. 225, 226 (1977).
101. See Chief Counsel Memorandum, supra note 4, at 3.
102. See, e.g., Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding a “congressional
desire that we make as liberal an interpretation as we can to accommodate the application
of NEPA”); NAACP v. Med. Ctr., Inc., 584 F.2d 619, 634 (3d Cir. 1978) (“Even in a case in
which the agency has no discretion ... substantial involvement [of the federal government]
appropriately subjects the agency to the provisions of NEPA.”). 
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implied exemption from NEPA’s requirements when an agency can
successfully portray its action as nondiscretionary.103
II. AGENCY STRATEGIES FOR AVOIDING THE ESA AND NEPA
The ESA and NEPA both require at a minimum that the agency
carry out, fund, or authorize an action for there to be any as-
sessment requirement in play.104 In other words, some identifiable
agency action must exist and the agency must have some connection
to the action before the question of whether the agency also has
discretion becomes relevant. The nondiscretion exemptions reflect
the additional requirement that there be some role for agency dis-
cretion to play in the action. Saving for later the question of whether
the ESA and NEPA nondiscretion exemptions are reasonable
103. See Robisch, supra note 38, at 185-88. Almost three decades after Flint Ridge, the
Supreme Court unquestionably tipped its hand that it would likely endorse the NEPA
nondiscretion exemption when it ruled 9-0 in Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen
that NEPA did not require the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to
evaluate the environmental effects of cross-border operations of Mexican-domiciled motor
carriers in connection with its NEPA assessment of new regulations it promulgated concern-
ing safety of the Mexican operations. 541 U.S. 752, 756 (2004). Because under applicable
statutes only the President could lift a long-standing moratorium on such cross-border
operations, and FMCSA had no ability to countermand the President’s lifting of the morator-
ium or otherwise categorically to exclude Mexican motor carriers from operating within the
United States once the moratorium was lifted, the Court ruled that “the causal connection
between FMCSA’s issuance of the proposed regulations and the entry of the Mexican trucks
is insufficient to make FMCSA responsible under NEPA to consider the environmental effects
of the entry.” Id. at 768. In other words, if all that happened was FMCSA’s promulgation of
the safety standards, there would have been no cross-border operations, thus the agency’s
NEPA assessment did not have to address the effects of the President’s independent decision
to lift the moratorium. Public Citizen thus does not involve the situation in which an agency
argues that its decision is entirely exempt from NEPA because of lack of discretion, which is
the thrust of the nondiscretion exemption claims covered in this Article. Therefore, Public
Citizen did not take up and resolve the NEPA nondiscretion exemption question expressly
reserved in Flint Ridge, a conclusion further supported by the fact that the Public Citizen
opinion never so much as mentions Flint Ridge, much less suggests it is deciding the question
Flint Ridge reserved. The majority opinion in Home Builders nonetheless points to Public
Citizen as generally supporting its endorsement of the FWS and NMFS joint regulation
creating the ESA’s nondiscretion exemption. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 667-68 (2007). We have little doubt that had the Public Citizen Court
or the Home Builders Court been presented with the question whether to endorse the lower
courts’ NEPA nondiscretion exemption, it would have. However, we do not purport to predict
with any certainty what the current or a future composition of the Court would decide in that
respect.
104. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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interpretations of the statutes and prudent policy, as the courts,
FWS, and NMFS have determined,105 in this Part, we examine the
different approaches agencies have used to fit their way into the
exemptions. To be sure, we are not suggesting that agencies should
overclaim the scope of their discretion or unnecessarily engage in
ESA and NEPA assessments. But agencies underclaiming the scope
of their discretion to avoid the ESA and NEPA should be a concern,
and the case law reveals a growing propensity among many agencies
for doing so. We have identified four distinct agency discretion
avoidance strategies.
A. Expired Discretion
Agency discretion often is exercised in one-off contexts, such as in
negotiating conditions of regulatory permits, property transfers, or
funding agreements.106 The exercise of discretion in such contexts is
concentrated in the discrete moment of the action, at which time the
ESA and NEPA apply. Therefore, discretionary authority arguably
terminates once the action is completed, and thus the time for ESA
and NEPA compliance ends. As the Ninth Circuit has explained,
“there is no ‘ongoing agency action’ where the agency has acted
earlier but specifically did not retain authority,”107 and thus, for
example, “[w]here private activity is proceeding pursuant to a
vested right or to a previously issued license, an agency has no duty
to consult ... if it takes no further affirmative action regarding the
activity.”108 In what we call the “expired discretion” approach to
avoiding the ESA and NEPA, agencies argue that their position fits
this scenario because they once could, but no longer can, take
affirmative discretionary action regarding the activity in question.
What is done is done.
The problem for agencies arises when conditions change after the
agency has in theory terminated its discretionary contacts with the
action. For example, a new species listing might put a previously
permitted activity in the path of the species’ habitat. Or, a previ-
ously “minor” federal project may significantly expand in scope,
105. See infra Part IV.
106. See Rogers, supra note 1, at 776-77.
107. W. Watersheds Project v. Matejko, 468 F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006).
108. Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1021 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
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becoming a “major” federal action subject to NEPA. Indeed, both the
ESA and NEPA programs contemplate changed circumstances and
can require reassessment of the action, but not after discretion has
expired. The ESA consultation regulations require “reinitiation”
only if “discretionary Federal involvement or control over the ac-
tion has been retained or is authorized by law,”109 and the NEPA
regulations require a “supplemental” EIS only for proposed ac-
tions.110 Hence the expiration of agency discretion shuts the door to
further ESA and NEPA entanglements for the action, but the
possibility that an agency may have somehow retained discretion
opens the door to questioning whether the agency has truly escaped
the assessment programs.
Although some of the expired discretion claims rest on indisput-
able termination of all agency contacts with the action,111 the
success of expired discretion claims has more often hinged on the
terms of the instrument the agency approved or entered into under
its statutory authority. For example, in the earliest example of the
expired discretion approach, Sierra Club v. Babbitt, the plaintiffs
argued that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) should have
conducted ESA consultation and NEPA assessment with regard to
effects from construction of a logging road across federal land
pursuant to a previously issued right-of-way agreement.112 The BLM
argued, and the majority of the Ninth Circuit panel agreed, that the
agreement created a permanent vested right and contained only
three conditions triggering BLM authority to enforce the agree-
ment—directness of route, interference with landowner facilities,
and excessive erosion—none of which was relevant to the protection
of species or the environment.113 Thus, the court concluded, BLM
had no ongoing discretion and, even if one of the conditions were
violated, could not withdraw or modify the road approval for the
benefit of species or the environment.114
109. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (2015).
110. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c) (2015).
111. See, e.g., Wild Equity Inst. v. U.S. EPA, 147 F. Supp. 3d 853, 864-65 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(stating that the EPA had no discretion regarding a permit it issued to an industrial facility
that had expired, having been entirely replaced by a state permit), appeal docketed, No. 15-
17502 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2015).
112. 65 F.3d 1502, 1507-10 (9th Cir. 1995).
113. Id. at 1511-13.
114. Id. at 1509. For a similar outcome, see Western Watersheds Project v. Matejko, in
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Sierra Club v. Babbitt holds a particularly notable place in the
nondiscretion jurisprudence because of the court’s nearly indistin-
guishable treatment of the separate ESA and NEPA questions.
After disposing of the ESA claim based on its interpretation of the
agreement, the court opined that “[t]o a large extent, our decision
concerning [the ESA claim] dictates the resolution of the NEPA
claim ... [because] [b]oth of the statutes’ procedural requirements
are triggered by a discretionary federal action.”115 Though the court
acknowledged a subtle difference in the two doctrines, noting that
“[i]f anything, case law is more forceful in excusing nondiscretion-
ary agency action or agency ‘inaction’ from the operation of
NEPA,”116 it nonetheless treated them as one singular legal theory,
as opposed to two distinct doctrines rooted in distinct justifications
and statutory schemes. The result has been to instill cross-statute
fungibility of the varying discretion doctrines across the ESA and
NEPA, as well as other federal laws imposing similar discretion-
based impact assessment triggers.117
Of course, whether an agency retains discretion to take action
under its governing instrument depends on how one interprets the
instrument and the agency’s statutory authority. In a dissenting
opinion in Sierra Club v. Babbitt, for example, Judge Pregerson
observed that an “environmental stipulation” in the agreement
authorized the BLM to halt construction of the roadway if it would
which the court held that the BLM did not need to consult regarding continued water
diversions on federal lands when the rights were vested under pre-1978 agreements. 468 F.3d
1099, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2006). Under BLM regulations, those agreements are subject to
agency control only if they substantially deviate from vested use or location, and in any event
the only enforcement remedy is to return to the vested use or location. See id.
115. Sierra Club, 65 F.3d at 1512-13. 
116. Id. How the court reached this conclusion is unclear. If anything, it appears that the
ESA excuse doctrine is more fully developed than its NEPA counterpart, given the direct
guidance supplied by the Supreme Court in Home Builders. See supra notes 68-73 and
accompanying text. NEPA has no such analog in the Supreme Court. Indeed, the doctrine
developed in response to the Supreme Court expressly reserved the nondiscretion exemption
question in Flint Ridge. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
117. In Sac & Fox Nation of Missouri v. Norton, the Tenth Circuit aptly demonstrated that
this issue is not confined to ESA and NEPA jurisprudence. 240 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (10th Cir.
2001). There, the Tenth Circuit was “persuaded that a similar [nondiscretionary excuse] rule
should apply” to National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) compliance, holding that
“because the Secretary exercised no discretion in acquiring [the land], he reasonably
concluded that NEPA or NHPA analysis would have been pointless.” Id. at 1263.
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violate any environmental laws.118 The agency construed this
provision as not providing any further discretion over the road than
already provided through the three enforcement conditions.119
Suggesting that the court not bind itself to the agency’s own
interpretation of its scope of discretion, the dissent argued that
“[t]he authority to review the project pursuant to the contract or
stop it until the conditions of the environmental stipulation are met
plainly constitutes ‘discretion,’ albeit limited.”120
The focus on contract interpretation in Sierra Club v. Babbitt
suggests the importance of drafting of agency contracts, permits,
and other instruments to define the scope of any retained agency
discretion or to make clear there is none. Indeed, the expired
discretion approach could lead to the perverse effect of agencies
actively omitting any hint of ongoing discretion from their agree-
ments and approvals. For example, in Environmental Protection
Information Center v. Simpson Timber Co., the plaintiff argued that
the FWS must consult under the ESA regarding a section 10
incidental take permit the agency had issued if subsequently listed
species could be affected by the permitted activities.121 The Ninth
Circuit agreed with the agency that, once the FWS issued the
permit, no provision retained agency discretion to alter the terms to
impose new requirements to protect subsequently listed species.122
In this sense, the agency action was completed once the permit
issued and thus there was no ongoing agency action over which to
exercise discretion.
Yet, as in Sierra Club v. Babbitt,123 there was room for a different
interpretation. A dissenting opinion in Simpson Timber objected
that the ESA regulation “does not require the parties to anticipate
the specific purpose for which discretion may be exercised in order
for there to be sufficient discretionary control that it can benefit a
newly listed species.”124 The dissent argued there were multiple
sources of discretion authorizing the FWS to reconsider the
118. Sierra Club, 65 F.3d at 1513 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1506-07 (majority opinion).
120. Id. at 1514 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
121. 255 F.3d 1073, 1081 (9th Cir. 2001).
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
124. Simpson Timber, 255 F.3d at 1085 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
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permit.125 Specifically, a regulatory phrase written into the permit
“reserve[d] the right to amend any permit for just cause at any time
during its term,”126 and a permit implementation agreement stated
that nothing in the permit limited the government’s authority or
responsibility to fulfill its responsibilities under the ESA.127 The
dissent thus concluded that “[t]hese sources of discretion, together
with the promises made by Simpson in its HCP, provide sufficient
remedial authority for [the] FWS to implement measures that inure
to the benefit of the [species],” thereby satisfying the condition of
retained federal discretion that triggers the FWS’s duty to reinitiate
consultation.128 Sierra Club v. Babbitt and Simpson Timber thus
could easily have come out the other way, suggesting that even the
slimmest reed of retained discretion in a permit or contract could
derail an expired discretion claim, depending on how a court
interprets the language.
In Sierra Club v. Babbitt and Simpson Timber, agency discretion
was held to have expired immediately once the agency concluded the
instrument.129 But agencies sometimes structure their regulatory
permitting processes in such a way as to ratchet down the scope of
discretion as a particular project moves through the approval pro-
cess, in effect expiring chunks of discretion in stages.130 A classic
example is Hammond v. Norton, in which plaintiffs alleged that the
BLM violated NEPA when it failed to conduct a supplemental EIS
for a pipeline project across public land managed by the BLM.131 The
BLM conducted an EIS for what was known as the Williams
pipeline project and granted the pipeline the necessary right-of-way
across BLM land, which included imposing environmental protec-
tion conditions.132 From that point, the BLM’s only additional
discretion over the project was to approve a plan of development
incorporating, among other things, the environmental protection
measures imposed in the right-of-way, and then to issue a notice to
proceed when the agency was satisfied the project would fully
125. Id. at 1084.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1084-85.
129. See supra notes 112-14, 121-22 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Hammond v. Norton, 370 F. Supp. 2d 226, 254-56 (D.D.C. 2005).
131. Id. at 231-32.
132. Id.
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comply with the plan of development.133 Before the plan of develop-
ment was approved, however, a separate Holly pipeline project
announced plans to expand capacity to the origination point of the
Williams pipeline, which could have boosted the amount of oil the
Williams pipeline would transport.134 The plaintiffs argued that this
required the BLM to prepare a supplemental EIS on the Williams
pipeline to account for the Holly pipeline’s environmental impacts.135
Had the Holly pipeline project been proposed prior to the approval
of the right of way for the Williams pipeline, the BLM presumably
could have taken its effects into account when designing conditions
for the Williams pipeline.136 But once the right-of-way was issued,
the BLM’s discretion to do so expired.137 As the court explained,
“BLM’s discretion now that the [right-of-way] has been approved ...
is limited to determining whether the proposed [plan of develop-
ment] adequately embodies the environmental stipulations set forth
in the [record of decision], and whether Williams is complying
adequately with those conditions, so that the [notice to proceed] may
issue.”138 In other words, although plan and notice approvals are not
“purely ministerial” acts,139 they do not trigger the kind of “discre-
tion that might usefully be informed by further environmental
review.”140
B. Dormant Discretion
Unlike the expired discretion claim, in some cases an agency
cannot plausibly deny that it could exercise discretion over a matter
that would allow further affirmative action regarding the activity.141
In what we call the “dormant discretion” category, an agency in this
133. Id. at 256. 
134. Id. at 254.
135. Id. at 256.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (“These actions by BLM are not ‘purely ministerial’ because BLM still retains
discretion to halt the Williams project should Williams not meet its environmental
obligations.”).
140. Id. at 255.
141. See, e.g., WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. EPA, 759 F.3d 1196, 1208 (10th Cir. 2014)
(contrasting sections of the ESA that authorize agencies to take certain actions with those
that require agencies to take certain actions).
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predicament argues that, despite possessing discretion to make a
particular decision, it is proposing no affirmative exercise of it at the
time and thus cannot be dragged into the ESA and NEPA as if it
were.142 The dormant discretion claim resonates with the simple
reality that agencies cannot be expected to be exercising all of their
potential discretion all of the time and thus should be subject to the
ESA and NEPA only when they are.143 For example, when the EPA
acted to regulate particulate emissions from a power plant to control
regional haze, it was not required to consult under the ESA
regarding other pollutants it possibly had discretion to also
regulate.144 As the court explained,
[T]he possibility that the EPA would have discretion—in some
other regulatory proceeding—to directly regulate mercury and
selenium emissions at the Plant did not impose a duty to consult
under the ESA before taking the only action under consideration
at the time. Life is short. The EPA can, and by necessity must,
proceed step by step.145
But the fact that the agency is not attempting to exercise
discretion at a particular moment has proven unpersuasive in cases
in which either the regulatory contacts never functionally expire or
the agency’s discretion appears to be generally “on call” and avail-
able for the agency to exercise at will.146 An example of the first
problem is Washington Toxics Coalition v. EPA, in which the plain-
tiffs argued that the EPA should have consulted under the ESA over
continued registration of pesticides under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) if the pesticides affected
listed species.147 The EPA argued that FIFRA alone governed
rescission of pesticide active ingredient registrations; thus, once
registered (at which time ESA consultation would take place), no
142. See, e.g., id. at 1208-10.
143. Id. at 1209 (“When an agency action has clearly defined boundaries, we must respect
those boundaries and not describe inaction outside those boundaries as merely a component
of the agency action.”).
144. Id. at 1203.
145. Id. at 1209-10 (footnotes omitted).
146. See, e.g., Wash. Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding
that the EPA’s discretion in regard to pesticides did not expire because such discretion is
ongoing).
147. Id. at 1028.
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subsequent action triggered the ESA consultation requirements.148
The court disagreed, finding that the EPA retained continual
discretion to alter the registration of pesticides for reasons that
include environmental concerns and thus must consult under the
ESA if it turns out that a registered pesticide is affecting a listed
species.149 Indeed, the court found the EPA’s argument “remarkable”
and flatly rejected the EPA’s reliance on the expired discretion cases
of Sierra Club v. Babbitt and Simpson Timber.150 As the court
reasoned, “[t]he principle enunciated in those cases does not apply
here ... because here [the] EPA retains ongoing discretion to register
pesticides, alter pesticide registrations, and cancel pesticide
registrations.”151 In short, some forms of agency discretion never go
away, and thus neither does the ESA or NEPA.152
In the second problem for dormant discretion claims, agencies
must be careful when they call on allegedly dormant discretion on
a regular basis, particularly if done through a formal procedure for
deciding whether to exercise discretion. The more structured and
hands-on this process becomes, the more the agency risks being
deemed to have crossed the line from possessing to exercising
ongoing discretion. For example, in Karuk Tribe of California v. U.S.
Forest Service, a split en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit rejected the
Forest Service’s position that its review of a mining company’s
notice of intent to conduct mining operations on public land did not
involve discretionary control that could inure to the benefit of
species listed under the ESA.153 The Forest Service argued that the
mining companies had a statutory right to enter public lands to
conduct mining activities and that the agency’s review of a com-
pany’s notice of intent did not include assessment of impacts to
species.154 In the Forest Service’s view, all the agency did was
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1032-33.
150. Id. at 1033.
151. Id.; see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 65 F. Supp. 3d 742, 760 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (stating that pesticide reregistration was an affirmative discretionary action), appeal
filed, No. 14-16977 (9th Cir. argued May 9, 2016).
152. See also Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 789 F.3d 1075, 1084-88 (9th
Cir. 2015) (requiring the Forest Service to consult regarding a newly listed species during the
interim between forest management plan revisions).
153. 681 F.3d 1006, 1017, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2012).
154. Id. at 1023.
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receive and analyze the information about the intended mining
operation.155 The Ninth Circuit observed, however, that the Forest
Service’s regulations allow the agency to take further action on a
notice of intent by requiring a company to submit a more detailed
“plan of operations,” which, according to agency regulations, could
have included species protection requirements.156 Indeed, the agen-
cy’s regulations pronounced broad criteria governing the decision
whether to require a plan of operations, including environmental
impact criteria, and the agency had done just that to several notices
of intent involved in the litigation and in those cases explicitly
identified species impacts as the grounds for requiring a plan of
operations.157 Piecing together the agency’s regulations and
practices, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “the Forest Service can
exercise its discretion to benefit a listed species by approving or
disapproving [notices of intent] based on whether the proposed
mining activities satisfy particular habitat protection criteria.”158 In
other words, exercising discretion to decide whether to exercise
more discretion is still exercising discretion.
C. Nonenvironmental Discretion
In what we call the “nonenvironmental discretion” claim category,
the agency concedes it possesses ongoing discretion over an action
and is affirmatively engaged in exercising it—thus eliminating the
expired discretion and dormant discretion claims—but contends
that its discretion is strictly limited such that species and environ-
mental concerns are outside its scope, making ESA and NEPA
assessment pointless.159 In other words, the agency argues that it is
not within whatever discretion it is purporting to exercise over the
action to consider factors relevant to the ESA and NEPA.160 The
Ninth Circuit has embraced this approach with a caveat that agency
discretion is necessary but not sufficient to impose ESA consultation
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1025.
157. See id. at 1020, 1025-26.
158. Id. at 1025.
159. See, e.g., Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2012),
aff’d, 718 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2013).
160. Id.
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on an agency action—for consultation to be triggered, the agency
must also be capable of exercising its discretion for the benefit of a
listed species.161 Similarly, courts have explained that as a general
principle NEPA assessments are not required when “agencies have
no discretion that might usefully be informed by further environ-
mental review.”162
A classic example involves the Animal and Plant Health Inspec-
tion Service (APHIS) and its removal of genetically modified
“Roundup Ready” alfalfa (RRA) from its list of regulated plants
under the Plant Protection Act (PPA).163 In Center for Food Safety
v. Vilsack, plaintiffs argued that the agency should have consulted
under the ESA to determine the effects on listed species of alfalfa
farmers’ increased use of the active ingredient in Roundup, gly-
phosate.164 APHIS did not dispute those possible effects, but argued,
and the court agreed, that regardless of the causal effects of its RRA
delisting decision on farmers’ glyphosate use, its statutory authority
extends only to the determination whether a crop itself is a plant
pest and thus provided no authority to determine where or how
glyphosate can be applied.165 Once the agency determined RRA
posed no such plant pest risks, that was the limit of the agency’s
discretion as far as the court was concerned and thus no duty to
consult regarding listed species was triggered.166
Although the PPA erected a formidable barrier between APHIS’s
plant pest determination and any discretion to exercise for the
benefit of species, the divide is less clear when courts appear willing
to probe harder to identify a source of discretion to trigger the ESA
or NEPA.167 A key principle in this respect is that the absence of
explicit environmental terms associated with the grant of discretion
161. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Jewell, 749 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2014).
162. Hammond v. Norton, 370 F. Supp. 2d 226, 255 (D.D.C. 2005).
163. Ctr. for Food Safety, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1009-10.
164. Id. at 1018.
165. Id. However, APHIS did complete a NEPA EIS on the decision to deregulate RRA,
because it had a choice between no action (not deregulating) and deregulating RRA, and the
plant pest risk did trigger environmental impact concerns. Id. at 1010-11. 
166. Id. at 1020; see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
541 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1100 (D. Ariz. 2008) (stating that HUD may not consider environmental
factors when guaranteeing loans, thus no ESA consultation was required), aff’d, 359 F. App’x
781 (9th Cir. 2009).
167. See, e.g., Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 340 F.3d
969, 975-76 (9th Cir. 2003).
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does not cinch the nonenvironmental discretion claim, or any of the
other forms of nondiscretion claim for that matter.168 As one court
put it, triggering the ESA or NEPA “does not ... require the statute
at issue to use environmental terminology for agency discretion to
be found: there is no environmental-words test.”169 Moreover, “an
environmental purpose need not be expressed in the enabling
statute.”170 Hence, unless the statute shuts the door as sharply as
the PPA did to APHIS, the question is what the agency could do, not
what it must do, to take species and the environment into consider-
ation.171 The approach, however, can lead courts down convoluted
paths of reasoning.
In Turtle Island Restoration Network v. National Marine Fisheries
Service, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that the NMFS had to
consult under the ESA when issuing fishing permits under the High
Seas Fishing Compliance Act.172 The statutory permitting provision
required the agency to “establish such conditions and restrictions on
each permit ... as are necessary and appropriate to carry out the
obligations of the United States” under an international treaty
intended to address the tactic of reflagging a fishing vessel to avoid
the species protection measures contained in bilateral agree-
ments.173 Because the permitting provision described the conditions
as “including but not limited to” the markings of the boat and
reporting requirements—conditions hardly conjuring up images of
species and the environment—the agency argued, and the district
court agreed, that it had no discretion to exercise on behalf of
species.174 But the Ninth Circuit interpreted the “but not limited to”
caveat liberally and observed that the statute included within the
scope of “obligations of the United States” all “international
conservation measures,” which the statute defined to mean
“measures to conserve or manage one or more species of living
marine resources.”175 Leveraging that combination of provisions, the
168. See Fla. Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133, 1141 (11th Cir. 2008); Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n v. FEMA, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
169. Fla. Key Deer, 522 F.3d at 1141.
170. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1172.
171. See id.
172. Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at 977.
173. Id. at 975-76.
174. Id. at 927, 975-76.
175. Id. at 975-76.
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court pointed to the sea turtle conservation terms of yet another
convention to which the United States was party—which made it an
“obligation[ ] of the United States”—to arrive at the sum effect that
the NMFS had ongoing discretion to condition fishing permits based
on impacts to turtle species.176 The NMFS had never purported to
hold or exercise such discretion when issuing fishing permits, but
the finding that the agency could do so was all the court needed to
require the agency to consult under the ESA.177
D. No Discretion
The ultimate and most frequently employed strategy for arguing
lack of discretion for purposes of the ESA and NEPA is what we
aptly call the “no discretion” claim, in which the agency contends
that its action is “purely ministerial” in that it is directed by a
statutory mandate—a “shall” or a “shall not”—leaving no room for
agency choice in the matter.178 For example, when a statute required
the Navy to conduct missile testing at a particular base, the Navy
was not required to consult under the ESA to evaluate the effects of
accidental missile explosions on threatened salmon “because the
Navy lacks the discretion to cease [missile] operations at [the base]
for the protection of the threatened species.”179 In other cases,
however, the analysis is not so cut-and-dry.
Home Builders is the leading no discretion claim case. The
statutory mandate in question was the Clean Water Act (CWA)
provision for transferring permit issuance and administration
authority from the EPA to a state.180 The provision enumerates nine
factors of “adequate authority” a state must demonstrate its state
program satisfies.181 If the EPA determines that adequate authority
exists, the CWA provides that the EPA “shall approve” the program
176. Id. 
177. See id. at 972, 977.
178. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 653-54 (2007).
179. Ground Zero Ctr. for Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 383 F.3d 1082,
1092 (9th Cir. 2004). The agency did, however, conduct an ESA consultation on aspects of
facility construction that were discretionary. Id. at 1092 n.8.
180. See Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 649; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2012) (providing the
full text of the CWA’s state permit program).
181. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b); Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 656.
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for transfer.182 Defenders of Wildlife argued that the transfer action
was subject to ESA consultation given that it was necessary to
authorize state administration of the CWA permit program.183 In a
5-4 split decision, however, the majority of the Court disagreed.184
As discussed above, the Home Builders majority endorsed the
joint FWS and NMFS regulation creating the “discretionary Federal
involvement or control” requirement as a reasonable interpretation
of the ESA—describing it as exempting from consultation “actions
... that an agency is required by statute to undertake once certain
specified triggering events have occurred.”185 The next question was
whether the CWA provision for transfer of permitting authority to
the states fit that description.186 The majority determined it did
because the provision specified enumerated standards that left the
EPA, in the majority’s view, no discretion “to consider the protection
of threatened or endangered species as an end in itself when
evaluating a transfer application.”187 Rather, the majority con-
cluded, “[w]hile the EPA may exercise some judgment in determin-
ing whether a State has demonstrated that it has the authority to
carry out [the] enumerated statutory criteria, the statute clearly
does not grant it the discretion to add another entirely separate
prerequisite to that list.”188 Hence, once the EPA finds that a state
has met the enumerated criteria, it is duty-bound to transfer
permitting authority to the state.189 The reasoning behind this “if
find/then shall” exemption appears to be that agency findings made
on the “if find” side of the process are not actions in the ESA sense.
The findings then trigger the action taken on the “then shall” side
of the process, but because the action follows from a “shall” com-
mand triggered by the findings it cannot be considered discretion-
ary. After Home Builders, any agency that can identify such an “if
find/then shall” trigger in its statutory program has found an
182. See Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 656.
183. Id. at 671.
184. Id. at 647-48, 671.
185. Id. at 669.
186. Id. at 671.
187. Id. at 671.
188. Id. As noted above, the majority also rejected the argument that the ESA imposes such
a prerequisite by its own terms, concluding that the ESA neither explicitly nor impliedly
preempted the CWA’s narrow enumerated standards. Id. at 664. 
189. Id. at 671.
2016] AGENCY DISCRETION 133
opportunity to insulate its “if find” determinations and the “then
shall” action they trigger from the burdens of the ESA and NEPA.190
Indeed, courts had embraced this form of the no discretion claim
well before Home Builders.191 A prototypical NEPA example comes
from the D.C. Circuit in Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails v. Surface
Transportation Board, in which the court faced a challenge to the
Surface Transportation Board’s (STB) approval of a plan to convert
a railway into a trail under the National Trails System Act (Trails
Act).192 Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the STB failed to
conduct the requisite NEPA analysis before approving the conver-
sion.193 The STB countered that it had no discretion in the approval
process because once the agency determined the railway was eligi-
ble for conversion under the Trails Act, it had no choice but to
approve the conversion.194 In siding with the STB, the D.C. Circuit
conducted a thorough analysis of STB’s discretion under the Trails
Act.195 Though it did not view it as an automatic nondiscretion
“trigger,” the D.C. Circuit noted that under the Trails Act, the STB
“shall” approve conversions that meet certain conditions.196 And
though the plaintiffs tried to couch those conditions as discretion-
ary, the court disagreed, noting that the six conditions “relate either
to the statutory conditions for sponsorship [of the trail] or to deci-
sions that Congress has determined shall be made by the railroad
and trail sponsor in their voluntary agreement.”197 Thus, the D.C.
Circuit deemed both the front end Trails Act “if find” analysis and
the final Trails Act “then shall” decision “largely ministerial” and,
therefore, it did not imbue the STB with sufficient discretion to
implicate NEPA.198 Similar “if find/then shall” statutory triggers
have supported agency no discretion claims in a variety of ESA and
NEPA contexts.199
190. See id.
191. See id. at 661 (citing cases).
192. 267 F.3d 1144, 1147-48 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
193. Id. at 1149.
194. Id. at 1150. 
195. Id. at 1152.
196. Id. at 1152-53.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell, 788 F.3d 1212, 1224-26 (9th Cir.) (stating
that an agency was required to approve oil spill response plans if it found they meet statutory
criteria as implemented by agency regulations), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 811 F.3d 1111
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Agency actions have failed to fit the no discretion category,
however, when the “if find/then shall” obstacle to exercising discre-
tion appears overplayed. A glaring example involves the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which has argued several
times that it has no discretion in its administration of the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) because once an area meets flood
insurance eligibility criteria, the statute requires the agency to
make flood insurance available.200 FEMA had already lost this
argument twice before Home Builders,201 but the agency took
another shot after the Court’s ringing endorsement of the “if find/
then shall” style of no discretion claim. While on the surface the
agency’s position parrots the Home Builders scenario, the difference
is that FEMA exercised its statutory discretion to design the NFIP
eligibility criteria by regulation and enjoyed considerable latitude
in how to craft them,202 whereas in Home Builders the statute
established the “if find” criteria that triggers the “then shall” man-
date.203 As the courts before it, the Eleventh Circuit saw through
FEMA’s no discretion claim in the most recent case, observing that
“although FEMA is required to issue flood insurance to localities
that satisfy certain criteria, FEMA itself is charged with developing
those criteria and enjoys broad discretion in so doing.”204 FEMA
could “tailor[ ] the eligibility criteria that it develops to prevent
jeopardy to listed species” and thus must consult regarding the
(9th Cir. 2015); Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 691 F.3d 1008, 1017-19
(9th Cir. 2012) (stating that once an agency adopted regulation required by statute for
defining criteria for operation of a dam, annual operating plans could not deviate from the
criteria); Sac & Fox Nation of Mo. v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250, 1261-64 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating
that once the Department of Interior purchased a tract using a public law’s funds, the agency
had no discretion in placing that land into a trust); Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1259
(8th Cir. 1981) (stating that an agency was required to implement nondiscretionary motorboat
restrictions); Nevada v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1246-47 (D. Nev. 2002) (stating
that a statute required the Department of Interior to take land into trust pursuant to
nondiscretionary statutory factors); Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581, 621 (D. Mass. 1997)
(stating that a statute required Coast Guard to issue vessel certification if vessel satisfied
statutory criteria, none of which related to endangered species), aff’d, 187 F.3d 623 (1st Cir.
1998).
200. See Fla. Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133, 1141-42 (11th Cir. 2008).
201. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. FEMA, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1174 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Fla.
Key Deer v. Stickney, 864 F. Supp. 1222, 1239-40 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
202. See Fla. Key Deer, 522 F.3d at 1141-42.
203. See supra notes 68-69, 180-90 and accompanying text.
204. Fla. Key Deer, 522 F.3d at 1142.
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development of the criteria.205 Nevertheless, in other cases courts
have found that agencies can impose an “if find/then shall” trigger
on themselves by promulgating tightly worded regulatory approval
criteria implementing more broadly worded statutory criteria.206
In some cases, the no discretion strategy does not depend on an
“if find/then shall” trigger provision; rather, the agency argues that
it is hemmed in by a statutory mandate or other constraint that
gives it no choice over the action.207 However, although a statutory
“shall” mandates agency action even when standing alone with no
“if find” trigger, it does not necessarily limit the agency’s discretion
to shape the action with species and the environment in mind. As
with the nonenvironmental discretion claim,208 courts have ques-
tioned what the agency could do without exceeding its authority, not
what it must do to fulfill its authority.209 For example, in RE-
STORE: The North Woods v. United States Department of Agricul-
ture, the court rejected the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA)
argument that the agency’s sale of fifty-seven acres of land to a ski
resort was nondiscretionary and therefore outside the scope of
NEPA.210 Though the court observed that the Sugarbush Land
Exchange Act (SLEA) limited the agency’s discretion in the land
exchange, it found that the agency did “not lack all discretion in the
process, its actions [were] not purely ministerial, nor [would] com-
pliance with NEPA be an empty formality.”211 While the SLEA
stated that the USDA “shall ... convey all right, title, and interest of
the United States in and to the land,” the SLEA nonetheless “did
not invade the [USDA’s] discretion to impose terms and conditions
upon the exchange ... [or] to consider whether the lands to be
acquired ... will be ‘acceptable’ in light of any environmental
205. Id. at 1144; see also Swan View Coal. v. Weber, 52 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1142 (D. Mont.
2014) (stating that the Forest Service must consult when developing criteria for accepting
land donations, even though it must accept land donation if the criteria are met).
206. See, e.g., Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell, 788 F.3d 1212, 1224-26 (9th Cir.), reh’g
and reh’g en banc denied, 811 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2015); Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation, 691 F.3d 1008, 1017-19 (9th Cir. 2012).
207. See, e.g., RESTORE: The N. Woods v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 968 F. Supp. 168, 170-71,
173 (D. Vt. 1997).
208. See supra Part II.C.
209. See, e.g., RESTORE, 968 F. Supp. at 175.
210. Id. at 173-74.
211. Id.
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consequences identified by a NEPA review.”212 The court thus looked
behind the statute’s “shall” mandate to uncloak discretion resting
generally within the agency’s statutory authority.213
Similarly, courts have rejected agency interpretations of contracts
as imposing “shall” duties obviating ESA and NEPA compliance
when there is so much as a sliver of an argument that the agency
has ongoing room to exercise choice on behalf of species or the
environment.214 Recently, for example, in Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Jewell, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Bureau of Reclama-
tion’s position that it could not renegotiate terms on renewal of long-
term water service contracts for diversions from the Central Valley
Project and thus did not need to conduct ESA consultation when
renewing the contracts.215 The district court had applied what it
described as the “federal common law” of federal contract interpre-
tation and held that the express terms of the contracts prevented
the agency from reducing diversion volumes on renewal.216 There-
fore, the agency had no discretion to exercise on behalf of an
endangered fish in the river system, the delta smelt.217 The Ninth
Circuit initially affirmed,218 but reversed en banc on the basis that
nothing in the original contracts required the agency to renew them
at all even under the same terms and, more to the point, the
contracts constrained renegotiation of only the quantities and
allocations of water.219 Hence, “the Bureau could benefit the delta
smelt by renegotiating the Settlement Contracts’ terms with regard
to, inter alia, their pricing scheme or the timing of water distribu-
tion.”220 Using that kind of “could do” interpretation of the contracts,
212. Id. at 174 (footnotes omitted).
213. See also W. Land Exch. Project v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1082
(D. Nev. 2004) (noting that an agency argued it had no discretion in land exchange and thus
need not undergo NEPA assessment, yet the applicable statute broadly required the agency
to “comply with ‘applicable law’” and expressly provided for “‘reimbursement’ of the costs of
NEPA compliance”).
214. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Jewell, 749 F.3d 776, 785 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
215. Id. at 784-85.
216. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 621 F. Supp. 2d 954, 979-80 (E.D. Cal. 2009),
aff’d sub nom. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Salazar, 686 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2014)), rev’d sub nom.
Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Jewell, 749 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
217. See id. at 1000-01.
218. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Salazar, 686 F.3d at 1100.
219. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Jewell, 749 F.3d at 785.
220. Id.
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the en banc court ruled there was sufficient discretion to trigger
ESA consultation.221
Agencies also have argued that they lack all discretion, not
because of a discrete “shall” or “shall not” in a statute or other
authority, but rather because a confluence of authorities mandating
and constraining agency action aggregates into the equivalent of a
nondiscretionary regime.222 Here as well, however, the distinction
courts have drawn is between what could be and what must be. For
example, in National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine
Fisheries Service, federal agencies overseeing dams and other
facilities in the Federal Columbia River Power System argued that
a “reference operation” designed to balance a plethora of competing
statutory mandates was, for all practical purposes, a nondiscretion-
ary baseline not subject to ESA consultation.223 However, the Ninth
Circuit interpreted the mandates as specifying broad goals, such as
flood control and power generation, without specifying exact
levels.224 Hence, “while the goals themselves may be mandatory, the
agencies retain considerable discretion in choosing what specific
actions to take in order to implement them” and thus could act on
behalf of species.225 By contrast, in Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton,
because a combination of “a Supreme Court injunction, an interna-
tional treaty, federal statutes, and contracts between the govern-
ment and water users ... account for every acre foot of lower
Colorado River water,” a district court found that the Bureau of
Reclamation had no discretion to release more water from federal
reservoirs into Mexico for the benefit of endangered species in the
Gulf of California and thus was not required to consult under the
ESA regarding effects on those species.226
221. Id. The Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion decades earlier when confronted
by similar contracts and the same claim by the Bureau. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Houston,
146 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that because the contract based delivery volumes
on “available water” and the Bureau could constrict the “available water,” consultation was
required). 
222. See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 928 (9th
Cir. 2008).
223. Id. at 926.
224. See id. at 928-29 (noting that the agencies had said as much in different reports).
225. Id. at 929.
226. 257 F. Supp. 2d 53, 66-69 (D.D.C. 2003).
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III. INSTITUTIONAL SYMPTOMS OF AGENCY DISCRETION AVERSION
The case law reviewed in Part II reveals some rather inventive
thinking by agencies in their quest to escape the ESA and NEPA.
Agencies have prevailed in some cases227 and failed spectacularly in
others.228 But there is more at stake than agencies’ win-loss records.
Taken as a whole, the rise of agency discretion aversion directed at
avoiding the ESA and NEPA raises concerns about the institutional
integrity of agency behavior, the capacity of courts to sort through
creative agency nondiscretion claims, and the effects on the ability
of agencies and courts to fulfill the purposes of the ESA and NEPA.
A. The Agencies—Trade-Offs and Gaming
One remarkable feature of the ESA and NEPA nondiscretion
cases is the myopic focus of the agencies and the courts on the
presence or absence of discretion purely in connection with the ESA
and NEPA. The written judicial opinions suggest the agencies and
the courts give no attention to the broader consequences of an
agency prevailing on its nondiscretion claim. But those conse-
quences could be very real and, in some cases, severe.
To begin, prevailing on a nondiscretion claim means the agency
must be comfortable with having no or limited discretion. In the
expired discretion context, therefore, the agency must cut all ties
with the action once the discretionary event—for example, issuance
of the regulatory permit or execution of a contract—is completed.229
To be sure, retaining the background prosecutorial discretion to en-
force against violations of a permit or breach of a contract has never
been held to constitute the kind of ongoing discretion relevant to the
discretion doctrines system, and that may be all the agency desires
in the way of its future relationship with the permit or contract. But
retaining any more formal relationship embodied in the permit or
contract, even a generic reopener clause, risks being found to have
retained discretion. Similarly, dormant discretion claims work best
227. See supra notes 112-14, 121-22, 130-40, 144-45, 163-66, 181-91, 193-99, 226 and
accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 147-58, 173-78, 201-06, 211-14, 216-25 and accompanying text.
229. See supra Part II.A.
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when the agency assumes essentially an inert position with respect
to the potential exercise of discretion.230 Registration procedures and
notice of intent review requirements thus undercut the dormant
discretion claim. Nonenvironmental discretion claims likewise
require the agency to stay unambiguously on the nonenvironmental
side of the discretion divide.231 And the full-on no discretion claim
requires the agency to behave in a purely ministerial manner.232
But the effect of prevailing on any form of nondiscretion claim
goes beyond loss of power to decide. Disavowing discretion for
purposes of the ESA and NEPA means the agency might have to
accept the consequences of throwing the switch to “no discretion.”
After all, some beneficial doctrines for agencies are based on the
presence or absence of discretion—mandamus, tort immunity,
officer immunity, and deferential judicial review.233 In the “if find/
then shall” no discretion claim context the agency would be subject
to mandamus if it makes the trigger findings but fails to carry out
the mandated action, and its reasons for not following through
would not be entitled to deferential judicial review. Agency and
officer immunities also would disappear. Similarly, if an agency
prevailing on a nonenvironmental discretion claim were later to
attempt to impose environmental conditions, it would be subject to
an ultra vires mandamus challenge and receive no judicial deference
regarding its action.
In some contexts, agencies may be perfectly comfortable accepting
these trade-offs. Consider an agency issuing a permit to construct
a home near the habitat of an endangered species. Issuing the
permit may require modestly burdensome ESA and NEPA assess-
ments that lead to a few conditions in the permit, such as avoiding
construction in a specified area. Once the home is built, however,
the agency has little at stake besides ensuring the conditions are
enforced, and the other discretion doctrines have no continuing
relevance. In that context, pursuing an expired discretion claim
would only be beneficial for the agency, as it could cut all ties with
the ESA and NEPA. With careful drafting, including omitting broad
reopener clauses to leave only basic enforcement of the terms of the
230. See supra Part II.B.
231. See supra Part II.C.
232. See supra Part II.D.
233. See Rogers, supra note 1, at 776.
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permit as a prosecutorial contingency, the agency could safely put
this strategy into action and stand behind the precedent laid down
in Sierra Club v. Babbitt and Simpson Timber.
As the cases covered in Part II reveal, however, in many contexts
agencies do not seem to really mean what they say when advancing
a nondiscretion claim to avoid the ESA and NEPA. To put it bluntly,
they wish only to avoid the ESA and NEPA and face none of the
“bad” consequences of disclaiming discretion. As the cases illustrate,
each of the four nondiscretion claim types agencies use to avoid the
ESA and NEPA contains the seeds of potential gaming designed to
retain discretion and its benefits by shifting or hiding its where-
abouts in the agency’s overall program. Agencies may engage in
such gaming simply to retain power over the action in some degree,
or more deliberately to claim the advantages of the benefits of
discretion when they are convenient. Although such gaming is not
evident in every case that tests an agency’s nondiscretion exemption
claim, in this section we identify four strategies agencies have used,
separately or in combination, to attempt to buffer the effects of
successfully claiming nondiscretion to deflect the ESA and NEPA.
1. Blatant Arbitrage
One bold discretion gaming strategy agencies employ is to pull
out the nondiscretion claim only when needed to stave off the ESA
and NEPA and put it back in the box for all other purposes.
Although we found no example of an agency simultaneously
declaring in one judicial forum that it has discretion—such as for
purposes of deflecting a mandamus action—but in another court-
room claiming nondiscretion for purposes of the ESA or NEPA, the
case law is replete with examples of agencies changing their tune
regarding their discretion depending on the audience.234 Generally,
this inconsistency is the result of an agency flexing its muscle when
broadly describing the scope of its discretion in a regulatory
program to regulated entities or the public, but then backing off
when confronted with claims that it improperly omitted ESA or
NEPA assessments for particular actions under the program. The
234. See infra notes 236-43 and accompanying text.
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obviousness of such flip-flopping, however, has not escaped judicial
detection—courts have frequently made agencies eat their words.
For example, in the most recent of FEMA’s trio of no discretion
claim losses involving its flood insurance program,235 the court noted
that while FEMA on the one hand argued lack of discretion for
purposes of ESA consultation, a finding that the agency indeed does
enjoy “discretion to consider endangered and threatened species ...
is consistent with FEMA’s own regulations implementing the NFIP,
wherein wildlife and environmental concerns are considered.”236
Similarly, in the Karuk Tribe case involving Forest Service review
of mining notices of intent,237 whereas the agency insisted that
“approval of a [notice of intent] is merely a decision not to regulate
the proposed mining activities” and thus not an exercise of discre-
tion,238 the agency had in a 2005 commentary on the same program
emphasized that it has “broad discretion to regulate the manner in
which mining activities are conducted on the national forest
lands.”239 The agency also had on numerous occasions rejected no-
tices on the basis of impacts to species and the environment, thus
“exercising ... judgment by formulating and applying different cri-
teria when deciding whether to approve or deny [notices of intent]....
This is the very definition of discretion.”240 Other examples include
the Bureau of Reclamation insisting it has no discretion to renegoti-
ate any terms of water delivery contracts when a prior agency legal
opinion concluded it had “considerable discretion,”241 the NMFS
arguing that it was bound by a myriad of statutes to manage
hydroelectric dam operations in a nondiscretionary manner when it
had previously declared that Congress had not prescribed the
precise manner of operations or levels of power generation,242 and
the Bonneville Power Administration’s contention that it could not
renegotiate terms of power delivery contracts notwithstanding its
declaration in a prior report that it “possesses a great deal of
235. See supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
236. Fla. Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133, 1143 (11th Cir. 2008).
237. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
238. Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1023 (9th Cir. 2012).
239. Id. at 1025.
240. Id. at 1026.
241. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998).
242. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 928-29 (9th Cir.
2008).
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discretion in contract matters.”243 In short, courts have made
agencies fess up when it appears they have been talking out of both
sides of their mouths.
2. Fuzzy Lines
When an agency clearly has at least some discretion to exercise,
a subtler discretion gaming strategy is to build flexibility into the
reach of the nondiscretion claim by obscuring the boundary between
discretionary and nondiscretionary actions. For example, the
Corps’s water infrastructure maintenance memo draws a line be-
tween the nondiscretionary “responsibility to maintain Civil Works
structures so that they continue to serve their congressionally
authorized purposes” versus the discretionary “how and when of the
maintenance activities [which] may be subject to Section 7 consulta-
tion if the process of maintenance (as opposed to the results of
maintenance) could affect listed species.”244 When a particular
action falls in this trio of buckets—maintaining purposes, process of
maintenance, and results of maintenance—will not always be self-
evident. The agency could use this ambiguity as cover to sort
discrete actions into discretionary or nondiscretionary modes and
thus allow the agency to both retain power when desired and
optimize the discretion doctrines, such as when protection against
mandamus for a particular action outweighs protection from the
ESA and NEPA.
Indeed, this kind of line blurring was involved when federal
agencies responsible for water management on the Snake and Co-
lumbia Rivers concocted a “reference operation” they contended was
mandated by the aggregate of federal statutes governing the rivers’
management and thus outside the scope of ESA consultation.245
When pressed, the agencies conceded that they “chose the reference
operation approach in order to avoid ‘trying to precisely determine
the extent of the Action Agencies’ discretionary operation.’”246 The
Ninth Circuit flatly rejected this attempt to “sweep so-called
243. Forelaws on Bd. v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1984).
244. Chief Counsel Memorandum, supra note 4, at 3.
245. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 524 F.3d at 928.
246. Id. 
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‘nondiscretionary’ operations” outside the reach of ESA consulta-
tion.247
To be fair to infrastructure and resource management agencies,
the beginning and end of their discretion often is not as neat and
tidy as issuing a one-off permit to build a home. Maintaining and
operating a major reservoir system and managing a national forest
are broad agency functions involving an ongoing multitude of
different decisions across time and space. If every discrete decision
were subject to ESA and NEPA assessment and its ensuing rounds
of litigation, agency management could grind to a halt. But if an
agency wants to deal with that problem by drawing lines between
discretionary and nondiscretionary actions, it can expect courts to
demand clarity and accuracy.
3. Decision Disaggregation
Another gaming tactic evident from the discretion aversion case
law is to carve up a particular regulatory action into more granular
decision components and tag threshold determinations as nondis-
cretionary, thereby squeezing as much of the ESA and NEPA out of
the regulatory program as possible while still retaining sufficient
discretion to effectively control the regulated activity at will.248 This
strategy was at the core of the Forest Service’s approach to regula-
tion of mining in national forests dealt with in Karuk Tribe, which
purported to divide the process into what the agency described as a
nondiscretionary first-step review of mining notices of intent and,
based on that review, possibly move the notice to a second-step
discretionary plan of operations negotiation.249 The court easily
detected the kink in that strategy, as the only way the agency could
have decided to move a mining project from first-step notice of
intent status onto the second-step planning of operations process is
to reach a judgment at the first step based on the notice of intent,
which the court observed is “the very definition of discretion.”250
247. Id. at 929.
248. See Mapes, supra note 38, at 275 (suggesting that agencies might try to segregate
parts of programs as nondiscretionary). 
249. Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1023 (9th Cir. 2012).
250. Id. at 1026.
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As described in Hammond v. Norton, the BLM used a similar
approach in disaggregating its review of pipeline rights of way,
though the discretion was phased out rather than phased in.251 BLM
conducted full ESA and NEPA assessments when granting a
pipeline the necessary right-of-way across BLM land, which could
have included imposing environmental protection conditions.252
From that point, according to its regulations, the BLM’s only
additional discretion over the project was to approve a plan of de-
velopment incorporating, among other things, the environmental
protection measures imposed in the right-of-way, and then to issue
a notice to proceed when the agency was satisfied the project would
fully comply with the plan of development.253 Although an invention
of the agency’s rules, the Hammond court agreed that the no-
looking-back effect of the phase out of discretion insulates the plan
of development decision from NEPA.254
Some agencies have employed similar decision disaggregation
strategies but in a less obviously sequential format as the Forest
Service used for mining Karuk Tribe or the BLM used for rights-of-
way in Hammond. For example, the Corps has developed a complex
permitting system for implementing section 404 of the CWA, which
requires permits for discharges of fill material into waters of the
United States.255 The permitting system spans from “general per-
mits,” which the agency promulgates by regulation for later use by
any action fitting into a general set of parameters, to “individual
permits” issued after a comprehensive agency review of a specific
permit application.256 For general permits, which cover many
different kinds of small-scale activities, NEPA compliance is
conducted at the time of promulgation of the rule creating the
permit, thus obviating (in theory) the later need for users of the
permit to conduct NEPA review, whereas NEPA review for specific
permits is conducted at the time of permit application review.257 In
this sense, use of a general permit by a qualifying project does not
251. 370 F. Supp. 2d 226, 255-56 (D.D.C. 2005).
252. See id.
253. See id. at 256. 
254. Id.
255. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012). The section 404 permitting program is discussed
extensively in Biber & Ruhl, supra note 20, at 160-73.
256. See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 20, at 160-64.
257. See id. at 167-68.
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constitute an exercise of Corps discretion. However, many of the
general permits require the user to submit a “preconstruction
notification” and allow the Corps to request and review more
detailed site-specific information and impose additional conditions
on the use of the general permit.258 Although this approach seems
similar to the Forest Service’s process for reviewing mining
notices,259 the Corps nonetheless treats these reviews as part of
general permitting and thus not triggering NEPA review.260 While
some courts have held that the act of verifying the applicability of
a general permit with no additional conditions added does not
convert the process into an individual permitting decision, others
have reasoned that more intensive review of notifications could
trigger more demanding process requirements of the Corps, which
would include NEPA assessment.261 And some courts have held
that the Corps fully crosses the line into NEPA territory when it
incorporates conditions on the project’s use of the general permit.262
Other agencies’ similar general permitting programs have raised
the same concern.263
We are not suggesting that agencies construct disaggregated
decision processes exclusively or even primarily to avoid the ESA
and NEPA. A reasonable objective would be to enhance administra-
tive efficiency by sorting out at the front end projects with poten-
tially substantial impacts to species and the environment from the
multitude of projects clearly presenting no substantial concerns. But
agencies have argued that this format does indeed insulate the
258. Id. at 172-73.
259. See supra notes 153-58, 249-50 and accompanying text.
260. See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 20, at 187-90.
261. Compare Spiller v. Walker, No. A 98 CA 255 SS, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18341, at *46-
47 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 1998) (finding that review constitutes specific action subject to
process), with Ouachita Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Bostick, 938 F. Supp. 2d 32, 35-36, 45-46, 46 n.7
(D.D.C. 2013) (finding that no process was required).
262. See Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 803 F.3d 31, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (stating
that NEPA was triggered when the Corps imposed species mitigation conditions on a project
using a general permit).
263. See Jennifer L. Seidenberg, Texas Independent Producers & Royalty Owners Ass’n v.
Environmental Protection Agency: Redefining the Role of Public Participation in the Clean
Water Act, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 699, 700-01 (2006) (discussing a split among the courts as to
when public notice and comment is required for project-specific use of a CWA pollution
general permit the EPA issued for certain oil and gas operation activities).
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purportedly nondiscretionary decisions from the ESA and NEPA,264
which presumably is not an inconsequential reason for constructing
decision review in this manner. We also are not addressing at this
point whether it makes sense to treat this kind of threshold decision
as an ESA or NEPA assessment event—that is a question we take
up later in Part V. The point to be made for now is that, if the
presence of discretion is to be the trigger for the ESA and NEPA, it
can stretch credulity for an agency to characterize its threshold
sorting decision as not demanding the exercise of discretion.
4. Firewalls
The final discretion gaming strategy is closely linked to the “if
find/then shall” no discretion claim type. In this approach, the
agency identifies a barrier to discretion—the “shall”—to act as a
firewall behind which it can, in effect, use the “if find” process to
exercise all or most of the discretion it cares to exert. Sometimes
the “if find” process truly involves no meaningful exercise of dis-
cretion,265 but often it does, in which case the concern is that
exercising this discretion without ESA or NEPA compliance can
undermine the purposes of the statutes.
The classic, and ultimately highly successful, example of the fire-
wall strategy is in the EPA’s CWA permitting authority transfer
process taken up in Home Builders. Writing for the majority, Justice
Alito fleetingly conceded that “the EPA may exercise some judgment
in determining whether a State has demonstrated that it has the
authority to carry out [the] enumerated statutory criteria,” but
quickly left that nagging detail behind.266 However, as anyone fam-
iliar with the CWA delegation process would know, EPA’s exercise
of “some judgment” is actually the locus of considerable and en-
during power over the states. As Justice Stevens pointed out in
dissent, not only does the EPA review state delegation applications,
but thereafter maintains a regular oversight role by entering into
agreements with the states receiving delegation that mandate the
264. See supra Part II.D.
265. See Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581, 621 (D. Mass. 1997) (involving a statute that
required the Coast Guard to issue vessel certification if the vessel satisfied statutory criteria,
none of which related to endangered species), aff’d, 187 F.3d 623 (1st Cir. 1998).
266. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 671 (2007).
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states allow the EPA to review state permits, object to and block
state permits not meeting EPA guidelines, and conduct regular
audits of state programs.267 The statute also authorizes the EPA to
withdraw delegation from states with deficient programs,268 a
process that has been described as “largely discretionary.”269 Indeed,
at one time EPA took the position that it must consult under the
ESA when granting state delegation precisely because of the
extensive discretion it wields over states, having changed its
position prior to Home Builders.270 Apparently life is better for the
agency when that discretion is hidden behind a firewall.
We are not suggesting that the EPA gamed the nondiscretion
claim by creating the firewall—Congress was responsible for the
CWA’s “if find/then shall” structure—but rather that it has taken
full advantage of the firewall to substantially expand its discretion
on one side while giving the appearance of being merely ministerial
in function on the other. For example, the EPA has issued a pleth-
ora of guidance documents outlining to states how it will administer
its sweeping oversight regime and elaborated in extensive detail on
the statutorily expressed criteria.271 Therefore, this is hardly a min-
isterial check-the-boxes “if find” process, as the EPA goes far beyond
exercising “some judgment” by essentially looming over delegated
states as an omnipresent overseer. As one commentator has sum-
med up, “[a]lthough this system is called cooperative federalism, one
can make no mistake about who is ultimately in charge—the
EPA.”272
To be fair, the CWA provision establishing the delegation
approval criteria speaks primarily to the state’s administrative
capacity and does not expressly mention endangered species, but
neither does it expressly preclude EPA from considering the effects
267. See id. at 688-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
268. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (2012).
269. Erik R. Lehtinen, Note, Virginia as a Case Study: EPA Should Be Willing to Withdraw
NPDES Permitting Authority from Deficient States, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
617, 628 (1999).
270. See Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 689-90.
271. See, e.g., NPDES Program Management and Oversight, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
npdes/npdes-program-management-and-oversight [https://perma.cc/8587-JJ5Y] (last updated
Mar. 1, 2016).
272. Lehtinen, supra note 269, at 623.
148 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:97
of state programs on endangered species.273 Several criteria are
quite open ended, such as that the state must show it has author-
ity to terminate or modify permits for cause, including for violation
of permit conditions, and will allow public comment on permit
applications.274 Based on reasoning in other ESA and NEPA
nondiscretion cases, particularly the Ninth Circuit’s reminder that
there is no environmental words test,275 the EPA arguably could ac-
commodate species concerns in such provisions or at least prod
states into designing their delegated programs with ESA purposes
among the permitting factors.276 The bottom line is that, far from be-
ing a ministerial agent in the delegation process, the EPA wields
extensive discretion over the states. All that seems to protect such
discretion from the EPA consultation requirement is the “then shall”
firewall the Home Builders majority made impenetrable.
Home Builders already seems to have influenced how lower courts
approach the ESA and NEPA discretion tests when confronted with
agencies’ statutory firewall claims, making them reluctant to chal-
lenge the agency’s assertion that it fits the no discretion category.
In two recent and prominent cases, for example, the Ninth Circuit
refused to peek behind the curtain to search for discretion on the
other side that could be leveraged to trigger the ESA or NEPA.277
Indeed, only FEMA has failed since Home Builders to convince a
court to turn a statutory “if find/then shall” provision into a barrier
to the ESA and NEPA, and even FEMA has been required only to
consult on its rules establishing the “if find” criteria, not on the
273. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b); supra notes 215-22 and accompanying text.
274. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(C)(i), (b)(5).
275. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Jewell, 749 F.3d 776, 785 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
276. Justice Stevens suggested ways the EPA could do this in his Home Builders dissent.
See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 688-91 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). EPA’s consulting with the FWS and NMFS also could shield the states from
allegations that their program implementation illegally takes protected species, as
consultation includes an incidental take authorization that extends to the action agency and
its permittee. See Chen, supra note 38, at 10,053.
277. See Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell, 788 F.3d 1212, 1224-25 (9th Cir.) (stating
that because agency is required to approve oil spill response plans if it finds they meet stat-
utory criteria as implemented by agency regulations, plan approval is not subject to assess-
ment), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 811 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2015); Grand Canyon Trust v.
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 691 F.3d 1008, 1017-19 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that once agency
adopted regulation required by statute for defining criteria for operation of a dam, annual
operating plans could not deviate from the criteria and thus were not subject to assessment).
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“then shall” act of issuing flood insurance once it finds a locality
meets the agency’s criteria.278
It remains to be seen how many other firewalls lurk in statutory
regimes for agencies to use in ESA and NEPA avoidance or how
extensively in the future Congress will take advantage of this
mechanism for deflecting the ESA and NEPA without having to
expressly exempt agency action from them, the latter being more
likely to attract attention. Of all the discretion gaming strategies,
however, the firewall strategy seems to have gained the most
immunity to judicial inspection and skepticism. Therefore, the end
result of a proliferation of Home Builders replicas would be to allow
agencies to wield all the discretion they could wish for before mak-
ing the “if find” findings official, then take the mandatory “then
shall” action without having to undergo ESA or NEPA assessments,
and then continue to exercise discretion over their decisions without
the ESA or NEPA haunting them and without accountability to the
interests the ESA and NEPA are intended to protect.279
B. The Courts—Applying Clear Tests with Incoherent Results
Two seemingly straightforward tests have guided courts in their
evaluations of agency nondiscretion claims: ESA consultation is
required if the agency has “any discretion to act in a manner
beneficial to a protected species or its habitat,”280 and NEPA is
triggered if the agency has any “discretion that might usefully be
informed by further environmental review.”281 But these tests have
proven easier for courts to recite than to apply.
At heart, the nondiscretion exemptions require the courts to scour
through an agency’s authorities and hypothesize how the agency
could maximally exercise discretion regardless of the agency’s
position that it has none or is limited in ways that exclude ESA and
NEPA review. This kind of comparison between agency authorities
and scope of discretion works reasonably well in the more typical
278. See supra notes 201-05, 236 and accompanying text.
279. For commentary on the erosion of agency accountability more broadly, see generally
David Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and Its Implications for Governance: The
Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1 (2005).
280. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Jewell, 749 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
281. Hammond v. Norton, 370 F. Supp. 2d 226, 255-56 (D.D.C. 2005).
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case in which an agency is claiming affirmatively to have discretion
and is being challenged in that respect as overclaiming. There, the
court can ask whether the agency’s position fits within the scope of
the authority and not worry about whether the agency could
exercise yet more discretion.282 But nondiscretion claims require
the court to essentially assume the role of the agency and think
about how far the agency could go were it to try to maximize its
discretion under the relevant authority and receive a court’s
endorsement. Designed to smoke out agency underclaiming of
discretion, this kind of role reversal, “what-if” thinking has proven
challenging for the courts and led to some contentious battles
between jurists.
Indeed, the judicial friction began with the earliest of the cases.
For example, the BLM’s expired discretion claim in Sierra Club v.
Babbitt, involving whether the agency had retained discretion over
a logging road right-of-way, sharply divided the appellate court
panel regarding the proper interpretation of an “environmental
stipulation” in the contract.283 The division within and between
courts seems only to have grown over time. For example, the EPA’s
no discretion claim in Home Builders initially failed in the Ninth
Circuit with a split panel sharply disagreeing over the scope of the
EPA’s discretion when approving state program delegation of CWA
NPDES permitting.284 The Ninth Circuit then denied en banc hear-
ing, with two dissenting opinions containing stinging, personal
critiques of the opposing judges and their respective reasoning.285
Ultimately, the judges wishing to grant en banc review and endorse
EPA’s no discretion claim won in the Supreme Court, but only by
the narrowest of margins as the Court split on a 5-4 vote with
sharply conflicting views of the scope of the EPA’s discretion in
Justice Alito’s majority opinion and Justice Stevens’s dissent.286
282. See Koch, supra note 2, at 474-75.
283. Compare 65 F.3d 1502, 1511 (9th Cir. 1995), with id. at 1514 (Pregerson, J., dis-
senting).
284. Compare Defs. of Wildlife v. U.S. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 968-71 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub
nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007), with id. at 979-80
(Thompson, J., dissenting).
285. See Defs. of Wildlife v. U.S. EPA, 450 F.3d 394, 395-401 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 402-06 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
286. Compare Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 664-73, with id. at 690-94 (Stevens, J.,
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The post-Home Builders judicial climate is no less contentious.
The Ninth Circuit has on three occasions used en banc proceedings
to air out its internal conflicts over agency nondiscretion claims. In
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Jewell, involving the Bureau
of Reclamation’s claim that it had no discretion to negotiate terms
of water delivery contracts for the benefit of species, a unified en
banc court reversed the panel decision and found that the agency
had sufficient latitude to negotiate terms of the contract to trigger
ESA consultation.287 The en banc result in Karuk Tribe was not as
harmonious. The prevailing view was that the Forest Service trig-
gers ESA consultation when making its threshold decision whether
to subject mining notices to closer environmental scrutiny, charac-
terizing the agency’s decision as fitting “the very definition of
discretion.”288 However, the dissenting judges held no punches,
accusing the majority of “undermin[ing] the rule of law” and
entangling agencies “in the ligatures of new rules created out of thin
air.”289 The two descriptions of the nature of the agency’s decision
could not have been more diametrically opposed. Most recently, in
Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell, a sharply split panel disagreed
over whether the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
triggers the ESA and NEPA when approving oil spill plans of off
shore drilling operations, with the majority finding the “if find/then
shall” trigger for plan approval insulated the agency from the
statutes.290 The Ninth Circuit’s denial of en banc rehearing came
over a strongly worded dissent.291
The upshot is that, notwithstanding uniform agreement among
the courts that the ESA and NEPA assessment programs apply only
when an agency has the right kind of discretion over the action, the
case law does little to help define when an agency has the right kind
of discretion over the action. Home Builders may have emboldened
agencies to advance nondiscretion claims, but the case has brought
no clarity in the lower courts, particularly the Ninth Circuit, where
dissenting).
287. 749 F.3d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 2014).
288. Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1026 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
289. Id. at 1031 (Smith, J., dissenting).
290. 788 F.3d 1212, 1219-26 (9th Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 811 F.3d 1111 (9th
Cir. 2015).
291. Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell, 811 F.3d at 1120 (Gould, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
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much of the ESA nondiscretion case law has transpired.292 Even
similar no discretion claims relying on the same firewall strategy
have met inconsistent results.293 Our point for now is simply that
the clear tests courts routinely describe for evaluating agency
nondiscretion claims have not produced a clear jurisprudence. We
probe possible reasons and solutions in Parts IV and V.
C. The Statutes—Undermined Information-Production Purposes
Courts and agencies justify the nondiscretion exemptions from
the ESA and NEPA on the ground that if an agency cannot shape its
decision to benefit or account for impacts to species and the environ-
ment, there is no point to conducting the assessment procedures.
But the ESA and NEPA also provide important information-
production functions. As the D.C. Circuit has observed with respect
to NEPA, “[t]he twofold purpose of NEPA is ‘to inject environmental
considerations into the federal agency’s decision-making process and
to inform the public that the federal agency has considered environ-
mental concerns in its decision-making process.’ Such information
may cause the agency to modify its proposed action.”294
The nondiscretion claim strategies appeal primarily to the
agency’s inability to fulfill the decision process purpose when it does
not have discretion to influence environmental outcomes. But not
having influence over the environmental outcomes of a decision does
not mean the decision has no environmental outcomes. Even if an
agency truly must take a particular action (no discretion) or its
discretion is limited so as to foreclose taking environmental
concerns into account (nonenvironmental discretion), the informa-
tion-production purpose of the ESA or NEPA may still be an
operative and useful policy goal. As Justice Marshall, paraphrasing
the Flint Ridge respondents, put it:
292. See supra notes 283-85, 287-91 and accompanying text.
293. Compare Alaska Wilderness League, 788 F.3d at 1224-25 (declining to require
consultation), and Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 691 F.3d 1008, 1017-
19 (9th Cir. 2012) (declining to require consultation), with Fla. Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d
1133, 1141-43 (11th Cir. 2008) (requiring consultation).
294. Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails v. Surface Transp. Bd., 267 F.3d 1144, 1151 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) (quoting Macht v. Skinner, 916 F.2d 13, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
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[E]ven if the agency taking action is itself powerless to protect
the environment, preparation and circulation of an impact state-
ment serves the valuable function of bringing the environmental
consequences of federal actions to the attention of those who are
empowered to do something about them—other federal agencies,
Congress, state agencies, or even private parties.295
However, one effect of the successful nondiscretion claim is to com-
pletely cut off that flow of information. For example, as discussed
previously, APHIS was relieved of undergoing ESA consultation
for its decision to deregulate RRA because the statute constrained
its decision to only consider the plant pest risks of the strain, which
does not encompass the effects of farmers’ increased use of
Roundup’s active ingredient, glyphosate, on species.296 However, the
problem with this reasoning is that the ESA consultation process,
as well as the NEPA EIS process, requires an agency to evaluate the
indirect effects of its actions, even if the agency has no discretionary
control over those indirect effects.297 For example, a section 7 con-
sultation for an EIS for a federal highway project will consider the
indirect effects of induced development over which the Federal
Highway Administration has no regulatory control.298 Thus, while
it is true that APHIS has no discretion regarding where, how, and
how much glyphosate is used,299 the indirect effects of deregulating
RRA very likely may have included increased use of the chemical.
Nevertheless, because APHIS could not have refused to deregulate
RRA on the basis of these indirect effects, but rather could exercise
its statutory discretion only with respect to its judgment about the
plant pest and noxious weed risks of RRA, the court agreed with the
295. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n, 426 U.S. 776, 786-87 (1976); see Robisch,
supra note 38, at 184. But see Dep’t of Trans. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768-69 (2004)
(describing the information-production purpose more narrowly, and somewhat circularly, as
being “to ensure that the ‘larger audience’ ... can provide input as necessary to the agency
making the relevant decisions” and thus if “the ‘larger audience’ can have no impact on [the
agency’s] decisionmaking,” the information-production purpose has no function to serve). 
296. See supra notes 163-66.
297. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (2015) (requiring indirect effects analysis); see also id. § 402.02
(defining indirect effects as “those that are caused by the proposed action and are later in
time, but still are reasonably certain to occur”).
298. See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1018-20 (N.D. Cal. 2012),
aff’d, 718 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2013).
299. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
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agency that ESA consultation was not required.300 The consequence
is that one of the indirect effects of the agency’s discretionary action
to deregulate RRA—the impact of increased glyphosate use on listed
species—remains unassessed. Had APHIS been required to assess
those effects and publish its findings, the information may have
influenced action by other federal agencies, Congress, state agen-
cies, or even private parties.
Of course, not every nondiscretion claim involves agency action
over a matter for which more information will be either available or
useful to anyone. But the same could be said about agency actions
that are indisputably discretionary—ESA and NEPA assessments
do not necessarily produce valuable information in all such cases.
However, the point of ESA and NEPA assessments is that the agen-
cy does not necessarily know ahead of time the nature and extent of
the action’s impacts or the value of that information to the agency
and other stakeholders.301 Shutting down assessments when the
action fits a nondiscretion claim category may make sense if only
the decision-improvement goal of the statutes matters—the decision
cannot be changed, so it cannot be improved—but the effect is to
ditch the information-production goal before even asking the
question whether there is any important information that could be
produced through assessment.
It is by no means clear, or even plausible, that Congress intended
such an outcome, particularly given that the statutes contain no
provision coming even close to creating a nondiscretion exemp-
tion—the ESA nondiscretion exemption is a creature of administra-
tive regulation and NEPA’s is one of judicial doctrine.302 If, for
example, there were a good chance that increased use of glyphosate
resulting from AHPIS’s deregulation of RRA would wipe out several
aquatic and avian species, does it make sense to interpret the ESA
as meaning that Congress would not want Congress, other federal
agencies, state agencies, and even private parties to know that? Our
point for now is that there is a cost to the statutory purposes when
agencies succeed in nondiscretion claims—a cost borne not by the
agency making the claim but by Congress, other federal agencies,
300. See Ctr. for Food Safety, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1020-21.
301. See, e.g., id. at 1018.
302. See supra Part I.
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state agencies, and private parties—in the form of lost information.
We turn in Part V to alternative constructions of the statutes as
ways to rectify this effect. First, however, in Part IV, we consider
what the ESA and NEPA nondiscretion case law teaches regarding
the nature of agency discretion in general.
IV. MAPPING DISCRETION’S NEGATIVE SPACE
As previously noted, legal scholarship on the ESA and NEPA
nondiscretion doctrines has focused primarily on their effects on the
statutory programs and purposes.303 We agree this is a significant
concern and cover it in Part III, along with the additional institu-
tional concerns we identify from our survey of the case law—agency
gaming and judicial incoherence. However, even if threats to the
statutes’ purposes were the chief concern, we believe scholars have
worked too narrowly in designing solutions around the ESA and
NEPA without first reflecting on what the nondiscretion jurispru-
dence reveals about agency discretion at its core. Agency gaming
and judicial incoherence flow not from any lack of clarity about the
ESA and NEPA nondiscretion doctrines, but rather from a lack of
clarity about the nature of agency discretion.304 In short, legal schol-
arship on the ESA and NEPA nondiscretion doctrines has treated
administration of the statutes as the complex issue and the question
of whether agency discretion exists as a rather straightforward
analysis, when in fact it has been just the reverse.
What is it about the nondiscretion cases that clouds the picture
of agency discretion? As we observed above in the discussion of
judicial incoherence, when agencies affirmatively assert discretion
and are challenged as having overclaimed, the court’s job is to mea-
sure the agency’s claimed extent of discretion against the statute to
determine whether the agency has at least as much discretion as it
claims.305 If it does, the agency prevails. This analysis does not
require that the court map the outermost limits of the statutory
boundaries on agency discretion, only that it locate the agency’s
303. See supra note 38.
304. See supra Part III.
305. See supra Part III.B.
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discretion somewhere on the map this side of the boundary,
wherever that limit might be in the distance.
By contrast, the nondiscretion claims require the courts to deter-
mine whether an agency has even more discretion than it claims. In
some cases, as we have shown above, agency claims of nondiscretion
go well beyond litigation claims, being backed up by agency
regulatory interpretations of statutes, complex regulatory programs
built around the agency’s position, and long-standing agency prac-
tice.306 Peering behind the agency’s curtain of legal arguments thus
can lead the court to explore and map the farthest reaches of
discretion the statute would allow the agency to exercise. By all
accounts from our survey of the case law, courts have frequently
been willing to embark on that mapping expedition, albeit the case
law has produced little clarity regarding how to chart the map.307
We call the gap between the line the agency has drawn on itself
and the line a court draws in its search for a more expansive
boundary line the negative space of agency discretion—the discre-
tion the agency legally possesses but refuses to acknowledge, much
less exercise. Perhaps the most important lesson from the ESA and
NEPA nondiscretion cases is that discretion’s negative space can
occupy a large amount of territory. Its presence, heretofore largely
unnoticed, raises profound questions regarding the temporal, spa-
tial, and institutional dimensions of agency discretion in general.
A. The Temporal Dimension of Discretion
The ESA and NEPA nondiscretion doctrines require that, for the
statutory assessment program to be triggered, there must be both
an agency action and agency discretion over that action.308 The core
rationale behind the expired discretion and dormant discretion ar-
guments is that the agency action and the existence of agency
discretion are temporally coterminous—the agency has no discretion
until it begins to take an action, loses discretion when it stops
taking action, and has no discretion between actions.309 In fact,
306. See supra Part III.
307. See supra Part III.B.
308. See supra Part I.
309. See supra Parts II.A-B.
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however, the nondiscretion jurisprudence reveals that action and
discretion can be temporally distinct.
1. When Does Agency Discretion Begin?
The decision disaggregation gaming strategy described above is
at heart an effort by agencies to ramp up a decision-making process
so that it aligns the timing of what the agency considers to be the
important substantive action with the time when the agency con-
cedes it has discretion that matters for purposes of the ESA and
NEPA. But if there is a possibility an agency will pull a particular
project out from the masses of no-concern projects at the “pre-
action” stage and apply more rigorous review and conditioning in
the “action” stage, when exactly is it exercising discretion? For
example, in the Karuk Tribe case involving Forest Service review of
mining notices, the agency described its action as the imposition of
conditions on mining projects that the agency has previously sorted
out at the notice stage as presenting potential concerns.310 The
dissent agreed with the agency that the sorting process at the notice
stage was merely about “receiving and analyzing information, and
deciding not to take further action.”311 The majority emphatically
disagreed, describing the decision not to take further action as “the
very definition of discretion.”312 Agency discretion began, in other
words, before the agency took any action other than deciding
whether it should exercise its discretion to place conditions on the
mining project.
If Karuk Tribe is the right way to think about when agency
discretion begins, it will not matter how gradually agencies ramp up
decision-making processes towards the ultimate substantive ac-
tion—discretion begins when the project notice or other form of
application comes across the transom. Even multiple sorting steps
will not buffer the agency action against Karuk Tribe’s reasoning—
the ESA and NEPA apply at the first sorting step. This conception
of agency discretion could have profound consequences for many
agencies. Consider the Corps’s section 404 general permitting
310. See Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2012).
311. Id. at 1037 (Smith, J., dissenting).
312. Id. at 1026 (majority opinion).
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program previously discussed,313 under which many of the general
permits require users to file preconstruction notifications allowing
the Corps time to decide whether to impose special conditions on the
project or move it over to the full individual permitting program.314
Tens of thousands of such notifications are filed and reviewed each
year around the nation, with most resulting in no conditions.315
Under Karuk Tribe, each such notification review triggers the EPA
and NEPA.316
To be sure, deciding not to take further action necessarily
requires some kind of judgment. If it is not an exercise of discretion,
then what is it? The ESA and NEPA programs incorporate mecha-
nisms to deal with what are obviously no-impact actions, such as
through NEPA’s categorical exclusion option.317 But Karuk Tribe
makes every sorting decision, no matter how preliminary, fair game
for full-blown ESA and NEPA challenges and potentially impedes
agency decision-making designs intended to manage agency re-
sources efficiently.318 Those impacts can be debated as a policy
matter; however, what is indisputable from Karuk Tribe, is that it
requires agencies to acknowledge the possibility of discretion’s
negative space and rethink when their discretion begins regardless
of when they believe their actions begin.319
2. When Does Agency Discretion End?
Just as the reasoning of Karuk Tribe makes it difficult for
agencies to buffer discretion at the front end of decision-making
processes, so too have agencies had difficulty shedding discretion at
the back end. Making a clean break can be a challenge. Recall, for
example, that Sierra Club v. Babbitt and Simpson Timber—the “go
to” precedents for expired discretion claims—had strong dissenting
opinions regarding the discretion-extending effects of seemingly
innocuous provisions in the instruments.320 The ramp-down
313. See supra notes 255-62 and accompanying text.
314. See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 20, at 162-63, 167-69.
315. See id. at 150, 167-69.
316. See Karuk Tribe, 681 F.3d at 1029-30.
317. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
318. See Karuk Tribe, 681 F.3d at 1030.
319. See id.
320. See supra notes 118-20, 124-28 and accompanying text.
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approach the BLM used for pipeline right-of-way review, under
which successive stages of approval decisions were locked in by prior
exercise of discretion over environmental conditions, depended for
its success in avoiding the ESA and NEPA on the agency’s regula-
tions clearly spelling out the handcuffing effects of the prior decision
events.321
To succeed in an expired discretion claim, the agency thus must
be willing to sever ties with discretionary control over the action,
either completely or in stages, and not look back.322 Even the
slightest hint that the agency has kept a finger in the action can
potentially extend the temporal reach of the agency’s discretion far
beyond when the agency considers its action complete. The question
can come down to whether judges take a narrow or expansive inter-
pretation of the effect of such dangling provisions.323 Indeed, courts
have disagreed even over the effect of generic reopener clauses, with
some ruling such clauses “in and of themselves are not sufficient to
constitute any discretionary agency ‘involvement or control,’”324
others ruling that they represent retained discretion by “specifically
contemplat[ing] discretion to amend,”325 and others ruling that a
reopener clause could confer retained discretion but if the agency
opts not to include one, it has severed ties with its discretion.326
The temporal tentacles of agency discretion cast a cloud over
innovative agency decision-making approaches such as adaptive
management. The idea of adaptive management is that agencies
should spread out decision-making “into a continuous process that
makes differentiating between the ‘front end’ and the ‘back end’ of
decision[s] much less relevant.”327 Rather than make one decision—
to issue a permit or develop a land use plan—and exit, agencies
employing adaptive management engage in a program of iterative
decision-making following a structured, multistep protocol using
monitoring and assessment to adjust decisions over time.328 With
321. See supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
322. See supra Part II.A.
323. See supra notes 112-14, 118-28 and accompanying text.
324. Cal. Sportfishing Prot. All. v. FERC, 472 F.3d 593, 599 (9th Cir. 2006).
325. Protect Our Water v. Flowers, 377 F. Supp. 2d 844, 873 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
326. See Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maint. Trust v. FERC, 962 F.2d 27,
32 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
327. See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 8, at 7.
328. See id. at 16-27.
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deep roots in natural resources management theory, the adaptive
management protocol has begun to find use in public lands manage-
ment.329
Some agencies have begun to insert comprehensive and complex
adaptive management provisions in their permits and contracts in
order to allow adjustment of permit or contract implementation over
time in response to changing conditions.330 The effect of such a pro-
vision on the agency’s discretion status is unclear. On the one hand,
these provisions usually specify “trigger” events, such as a signifi-
cant decrease in species population, required for the agency to
operationalize the adaptive management protocol.331 The trigger
event requirement arguably constrains the agency’s discretion.332 On
the other hand, the presence of an adaptive management provision
implies a long-term, continuing, substantive role for the agency,
with the possibility of its exertion of discretion always looming.333
An adaptive management provision is no mere reopener clause. In
short, the agency’s authority to exercise discretion, while con-
strained by the trigger events, cannot reasonably be described as
having fully expired. No court has yet been asked to divine what the
negative space of the adaptive management approach means for
purposes of the ESA and NEPA.
3. When Is Agency Discretion Perpetual?
Even if an agency’s discretion unambiguously begins and ends
when its action begins and ends, the dormant discretion cases reveal
a nagging ambiguity regarding the status of agency discretion
between actions.334 For example, because the EPA was not required
329. Id. at 7-8. The adaptive management protocol has also been noted to appear in other
policy contexts, such as pollution control, financial regulation, environmental impact asses-
sment, public health and safety, civil rights, and social welfare. See id. at 8.
330. See id. at 25-26. See generally Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the
Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65
Fed. Reg. 35,242 (June 1, 2000) (providing notice of, and reasons for, the adaptive manage-
ment revisions).
331. See, e.g., Courtney Schultz & Martin Nie, Decision-Making Triggers, Adaptive
Management, and Natural Resources Law and Planning, 52 NAT. RESOURCES J. 443, 455-56
(2012).
332. See id. at 455.
333. See id.
334. See supra Part II.B.
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to consult under the ESA regarding pollutants it had discretion to
regulate simply because it chose to regulate other pollutants,335 the
EPA has found itself perpetually locked into a “discretion on” po-
sition to consult about pesticides it has registered under FIFRA in
the past.336 Even though the agency consults when taking the initial
registration action, the registration action clearly qualifies as final
agency action, and FIFRA specifies a time for a reregistration re-
view decision at which time the agency will consult again.337
Therefore, the courts consider the ongoing registered status of a
pesticide between the registration and reregistration actions as
preventing the agency from turning off its discretion between the
two actions.338 Similarly, the Forest Service has been deemed stuck
in “discretion on” status between its forest management plan ap-
proval actions because it has “continuing authority” over the plans
and thus “a continuing obligation” to consult under the ESA when
species-relevant conditions change.339 Each plan is a discrete final
agency action, but these plans emanate a kind of ongoing aura of
discretionary authority the agency cannot turn off between plans.
On the one hand, imposing perpetual discretion status on an
agency prevents the agency from falling asleep between actions with
regard to species and the environment. On the other hand, many
statutory programs anticipate spacing out successive actions, such
as plans for public lands and permits for ongoing facilities, as
discrete final agency actions.340 Thus the programs may be pre-
sumed to give the agencies a break from the ESA and NEPA in
between. Nevertheless, in what represents the most extreme
temporal disconnect between action and discretion, agencies
advancing dormant discretion claims must be prepared for courts to
redraw the discretion boundary, transforming the negative space of
discretion—the interlude between successive final actions—into the
agency’s ball and chain of perpetual discretion.
335. See WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. EPA, 759 F.3d 1196, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 2014); supra
notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
336. See Wash. Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 2005).
337. See id.
338. See id.; supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
339. See Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 789 F.3d 1075, 1084-88 (9th Cir.
2015), petition for cert. filed, No. 15-01387 (U.S. May 13, 2016).
340. See, e.g., Biber & Ruhl, supra note 20, at 176.
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B. The Spatial Dimension of Discretion
In addition to requiring an action and discretion over the action,
the ESA and NEPA nondiscretion doctrines require that the agen-
cy’s discretion have some connection to the statutory zones of
interest—species for the ESA and, more broadly, the environment
for NEPA. The core rationale behind the nonenvironmental discre-
tion and no discretion claims is that the agency’s discretion does not
meet that condition, that the boundaries on the agency’s discretion
do not creep into the space of the ESA and NEPA.341 However, as
with the temporal dimension,342 the case law reveals a substantial
negative space problem for such claims.
1. Can Discretion Be Compartmentalized?
The nonenvironmental discretion claim depends for its success on
spatial compartmentalization of the agency’s discretion so as to ex-
clude anything having to do with the ESA and NEPA.343 Similarly,
some forms of the no discretion claim depend on the court agreeing
to a sharp boundary line ending where the ESA and NEPA begin.344
Yet the courts have emphatically rejected the idea that there is an
“environmental-words test” for delineating the spatial dimension of
agency discretion,345 and have expanded the spatial analysis from
what an agency must do to what it could do.346 Moreover, because
the ESA and NEPA map out different zones of interest—the ESA
more narrowly focuses on species compared to NEPA’s sweeping
embrace of all matters environmental—the nonenvironmental dis-
cretion claim faces two negative space mapping challenges. Some
courts treat the two as roughly the same in scope for these pur-
poses,347 but APHIS’s deregulation of Roundup-Ready Alfalfa
demonstrates that the two zones are not always coterminous:
341. See supra Parts II.C-D.
342. See supra Part IV.A.
343. See supra Part II.C.
344. See supra Part II.D.
345. See Fla. Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133, 1141 (11th Cir. 2008); supra note 170
and accompanying text.
346. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. FEMA, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2004);
supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
347. See Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1512-13 (9th Cir. 1995).
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APHIS prepared a NEPA assessment because its noxious weed as-
sessment necessarily touches on environmental concerns but was
able to wall out the ESA because species concerns inarguably could
not play into its decision.348
In the absence of clearly delineated compartments of discretion,
the courts, having eschewed an “environmental-words test” and
moved from “must do” to “could do,” have been quite willing to ex-
plore discretion’s negative space. An extreme example is the Turtle
Island case, in which the court patched together provisions from
far-flung international conventions to import species-protection
discretion into NMFS’s domestic fishing permit program.349 But the
courts have repeatedly made it look easy to poke holes in agency
boundary drawing, rejecting arguments that a statutory “shall”
or “shall not,” without more, necessarily precludes consideration of
species and environmental impacts.350 The upshot of the non-
discretion doctrines case law is that, rather than drawing a
nonenvironmental line on the discretion map, the absence of ESA
and NEPA interests on the face of the statute in fact invites courts
to search harder for discretion’s negative space.
2. Does “If Find” Discretion Matter?
The “if find/then shall” form of no discretion claims depends for
its success on convincing the court of the firewall effect of the spatial
separation between “if find” discretion and “then shall” nondiscre-
tion. As discussed above, there is disagreement among lower courts
regarding how far Home Builders goes in putting the “if find” dis-
cretion off limits for negative space exploration.351 The majority in
Home Builders inaccurately claimed that the EPA exercises only
“some judgment” in making the findings requisite for program
delegation,352 suggesting that if an agency may exercise much or
extensive judgment, the firewall might be less secure. Home
348. See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1010-11 (N.D. Cal. 2012),
aff’d, 718 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2013); supra notes 163-66, 296-300 and accompanying text.
349. See Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 340 F.3d 969,
971 (9th Cir. 2003); supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
350. See supra Part II.D.
351. See supra Part II.D. 
352. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 671 (2007). The
EPA in fact exercises extensive judgment over the findings. See supra Part III.A.4.
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Builders thus arguably does not resolve how much and what kind
of discretion over the “if find” decision it would take to defeat the
shield of the “then shall” mandate.353
For example, consider again the ESA’s section 10 incidental take
permitting provision involved in Simpson Timber.354 Much like the
CWA transfer provision, the ESA permit provision enumerates
several criteria for permit issuance and provides that “if the Secre-
tary finds” the applicant has satisfied the criteria “the Secretary
shall issue the permit.”355 The issuance criteria range from the
mundane, such as “the applicant will ensure that adequate funding
for the plan will be provided,”356 to the open-ended “such other
measures that the Secretary may require as being necessary or
appropriate for purposes of the plan.”357 Under Home Builders, one
could reasonably argue that once the agency makes the specified
findings, the permit must be issued and thus the agency is not
required to consult under the ESA or conduct environmental impact
assessment under the NEPA.358 The “such other measures” crite-
rion, however, arguably opens the door to broader discretion over
the terms of the permit.359 Does such discretion, depending on its
bounds, negate the principles of Home Builders, or does the “shall
issue” command make the scope of discretion in defining the “such
other measures” terms of the permit irrelevant? As a matter of pol-
icy, the FWS and NMFS routinely subject section 10 incidental take
permits to the ESA and NEPA processes,360 but after Home Build-
ers, it is not at all clear that they must do so.361
As Justice Stevens argued in his Home Builders dissent, “our an-
alysis should not end simply because a statute uses the word ‘shall.’
Instead, we must look more closely at its listed criteria to determine
353. See supra Part III.A.4.
354. See Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 2001).
355. 16 U.S.C. 1539(a)(2)(B) (2012).
356. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iii).
357. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(iv), (B)(v).
358. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 673 (2007).
359. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (a)(2)(A)(iv).
360. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANNING AND INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT PROCESSING HANDBOOK, 1-5 to -7
(1996), https://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/permits/hcp/hcphandbook.html [https://
perma.cc/H44E-B2JB].
361. See Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 673.
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whether they allow for discretion, despite the use of ‘shall.’”362 At
heart, his observation is about how deeply courts should explore the
negative space of agency discretion. As he suggested, EPA could use
its “if find” discretion to require that states ensure species protec-
tion as a condition of delegation.363 In fact, the EPA did exactly that
under its earlier position that ESA consultation was required.364 It
remains to be seen how far the lower courts will follow Justice
Stevens’s lead in searching for negative space behind the firewalls
agencies erect.365
C. Institutional Discretion over Discretion
At bottom, Justice Stevens’s admonition in Home Builders is also
about the institutional dimensions of discretion’s negative space.366
The specific inquiry focuses on who gets to map the negative space:
agencies or courts?367 This question arises in the ESA and NEPA
nondiscretion cases in two distinct contexts. One involves instances
in which the agency acknowledges that it could exercise discretion
triggering the ESA and NEPA but takes affirmative steps to prevent
itself from doing so;368 the other involves instances in which the
agency interprets its authority to fit one of the nondiscretion
claims.369
362. Id. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
363. See id. at 689-90 (describing the EPA’s ability to negotiate provisions requiring a state
to protect endangered species in accordance with ESA § 7(a)(2) to receive pollution permits).
364. Id.
365. Similar critiques of the firewall effect of “if find/then” statutory structures have been
made with regard to so-called Field delegation, in which a Congress delegates authority to the
Executive to act if specified contingencies are declared to exist. See Kevin M. Stack, The Con-
stitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 982-83 (2007) (explaining the Field or
contingency theory of delegation and critiquing its effects). See generally Field v. Clark, 143
U.S. 649 (1892).
366. See Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 678-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
367. See id. (explaining the discord between the courts’ and agencies’ interpretations of
discretions negative space).
368. See infra Part IV.C.1.
369. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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1. Do Agencies Have Discretion to Abdicate Discretion?
The “must do” versus “could do” distinction drawn in the nondis-
cretion case law, with courts emphatically adopting a “could do” test,
becomes particularly fuzzy when the agency’s nondiscretion claim
is reasonably based on the terms of a contract or permit but the
statute authorizing the agency to enter into the instrument argu-
ably provided authority to exercise more discretion. For example,
the court in Simpson Timber interpreted the terms of the ESA
incidental take permit issued by the FWS to rule out any continuing
discretion, thus fitting the expired discretion category.370 But what
if the agency could have approved a permit with clear reopener
clauses retaining ongoing discretion? Indeed, the statutory provision
for issuing incidental take permits confers broad discretion on the
FWS and NMFS to impose “such other measures that the Secretary
may require as being necessary or appropriate for purposes of the
plan.”371 Arguably, this would authorize a permit provision requiring
future consultations to determine whether a species listed after the
permit is issued could be affected by the actions approved in the
permit. Assuming that the FWS and NMFS have discretion to
include such a reopener condition in section 10 permits, does the
fact that they do not do so in a particular permit mean it fits the
expired discretion category? Or does the fact that the agencies could
insert such a provision mean section 10 permits inherently impli-
cate the agencies’ ongoing discretion? The Simpson Timber court did
not open the door to this line of analysis.
Allowing agencies to voluntarily abdicate their own discretion
creates perverse incentives. As discussed above, effective admin-
istration of regulatory permit programs may lean in favor of
incorporating adaptive management provisions in permits and
contracts,372 but it behooves agencies not to do so if they hope to
assert an expired discretion claim.373 Allowing the agency to opt in
and out of the ESA and NEPA might not produce a coherent
adaptive management policy. Also, if the agency opts not to include
370. See Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073, 1082-83 (9th Cir.
2001); supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
371. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(a)(iv) (2012).
372. See supra notes 327-33 and accompanying text.
373. See supra Part II.A.
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reopener clauses triggered by ESA and NEPA concerns, effectively
cutting off its discretion when the permit or contract is signed,
courts will need to police against the agency later gaming the same
action as discretionary because the statute itself, instead of the
specific contract, confers broad discretion. Courts could avoid these
concerns by taking the “could do” test to its logical negative space
limits,374 finding that the ESA and NEPA are triggered so long as
the agency could have included reopener, adaptive management,
and similar provisions. On the other hand, in the ESA section 10
permitting example, Congress provided that the agency “may
require” such provisions, suggesting that it gave the agency case-by-
case authority to determine whether it wants continued discretion
or not, based on any factors the agency deems relevant.375 If it opts
not to, the only condition is that it stick to an expired discretion
consequence and not later attempt to revive its discretion out of
negative space.376 The nondiscretion case law provides no clear
direction as to which approach is required.
2. Must Courts Defer?
Resolution of agency ESA and NEPA nondiscretion claims in-
evitably leads to questions of statutory interpretation and thus in
turn to the topic of judicial deference. The negative space concept is
inherently about the gap, if any, between the agency’s interpretation
of its statutory authority and the court’s.377 This is true even when
the agency directly bases its nondiscretion claims on the terms of
a permit or contract or on the provisions of its own regulations:
the “could do” test necessarily leads back to the proper interpreta-
tion of the agency’s statutory authority. Nevertheless, courts
weighing agency nondiscretion claims seldom engage in any kind of
judicial deference analysis, and when they do the result is a bit of
a muddle.378 To be sure, courts hearing nondiscretion claims have
had little trouble evaluating the deference given to an agency’s
374. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 121-22, 355-60 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 121-22, 355-60 and accompanying text.
377. See supra Part IV.A.
378. See supra Part III.B.
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interpretation of its own organic statutes and other authorities.379
The problem arises from the other pieces of the puzzle—what do the
ESA and NEPA mean, and how do the two fit together with agen-
cies’ authorizing statutes?
The first question is about the scope of the ESA and NEPA
nondiscretion doctrines. Courts have consistently held that because
they do not administer the ESA and NEPA, action agencies are not
entitled to any deference regarding their interpretation of those
statutes.380 This principle ought to apply to interpretations of the
ESA and NEPA nondiscretion doctrines, but this has been pointed
out only by judges dissenting from opinions endorsing an agency’s
nondiscretion claim.381 The analysis is further complicated by the
fact that the ESA nondiscretion doctrine is a creature of agency
rulemaking—the FWS and NMFS have promulgated a rule inter-
preting the statute to imply the exemption, which the Home
Builders majority deemed a reasonable interpretation entitled to
Chevron deference.382 However, the NEPA doctrine is entirely a
creature of judicial interpretation.383 Therefore, in the ESA’s case,
agencies are purporting to interpret another agency’s Chevron-
blessed rule that interprets the statute, whereas in NEPA’s case,
agencies are interpreting a judge-made interpretation of the statute.
The second question is about which statutory regime—the
agency’s authorizing statute or the ESA and NEPA duo—defines
discretion’s negative space. On the one hand, the action agency’s
authorizing statute defines the boundaries of its discretion.384 On
the other hand, the ESA and NEPA define the boundaries of their
respective nondiscretion doctrines and of the scope of species and
379. See, e.g., Defs. of Wildlife v. Norton, 257 F. Supp. 2d 53, 66-69 (D.D.C. 2003) (con-
cluding that the agency’s interpretation of various statutes, compacts, and other authorities
comprising the Law of the River was entitled, at the very least, to Skidmore deference).
380. See, e.g., Grand Canyon Trust v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339, 342 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (explaining
that the court owes no deference to the FAA’s interpretation of NEPA because Congress did
not entrust its administration to the agency alone).
381. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 682-83 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
382. Id. at 673 (majority opinion).
383. See supra Part I.B.
384. See Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell, 788 F.3d 1212, 1221-23 (9th Cir.) (treating
the question as one of interpretation of the agency’s authorizing statute), reh’g and reh’g en
banc denied, 811 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2015).
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environmental concerns.385 However, tests the courts have articu-
lated conflate the two. One such test requires ESA consultation if
the agency has “any discretion to act in a manner beneficial to a
protected species or its habitat,”386 and another triggers NEPA if the
agency has any “discretion that might usefully be informed by
further environmental review.”387 Perhaps it is no surprise that
courts hearing nondiscretion claims generally skip the judicial
deference analysis. Nonetheless, the question is a serious one, as it
will drive the negative space analysis either toward agency claims
that negative space does not exist or toward allowing judicial
mapping expeditions. Yet we could not divine from the nondiscretion
case law even a rough pattern to suggest which statutory regimes
the courts believe they and agencies are interpreting. At best, the
pattern appears to be a blend of both regimes, lending further
support to our thesis that discretion’s negative space is an elusive
creature in the already dense jungle of administrative law.388
V. EVALUATING REMEDIES FOR THE DISCRETION AVERSION
SYNDROME
The ESA and NEPA nondiscretion case law extends the problems
agency discretion aversion poses for the ESA and NEPA well be-
yond the statutes. The real challenge is to find a way to reduce the
opportunity for discretion’s negative space to creep into the picture
in the first place. This could be acheived through courts tightening
down on agencies,389 FWS, NMFS, and CEQ smoothing out the way
the ESA and NEPA work,390 or decoupling agency discretion from
the ESA and NEPA entirely.391 Each approach requires some re-
thinking of the nature of agency discretion and its negative space.
385. See supra Part I.
386. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Jewell, 749 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
387. Hammond v. Norton, 370 F. Supp. 2d 226, 230 (D.D.C. 2005).
388. The majority in Home Builders engaged in Chevron Step Two analysis of the ESA for
purposes of upholding the regulatory nondiscretion exemption and applied Auer deference to
a letter FWS and NMFS issued to EPA finding that NPDES delegation is nondiscretionary
within the meaning of the regulation. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
551 U.S. 644, 672-73 (2007).
389. See infra Part V.A.
390. See infra Part V.B.
391. See infra Part V.C.
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Of the three, we conclude that only the decoupling approach offers
a plausible way out of the morass.
A. Tightening—Discretion as a Toggle Switch
Putting a spotlight on discretion’s negative space challenges the
conventional “on or off” toggle switch conception of agency discre-
tion. But courts could go far toward shrinking negative space
territory by more aggressively enforcing the tests they have
developed for the presence of agency discretion, thus placing a stiff
burden on the agency to satisfy the tests before throwing the switch
to off. Under this approach, courts would extend no deference to the
agency’s description of its discretionary boundaries on the basis that
the question is a matter of ESA and NEPA scope, not of the agency’s
authorizing statute. Courts would take the “could do” inquiry to its
fullest when interpreting the agency’s authorizing statute, even
going so far as to require agencies opting not to include reopener
and similar provisions in contracts and permits to nonetheless con-
duct ESA and NEPA assessments. Furthermore, Home Builders
would be limited in firewall cases to statutory “if find/then shall” re-
gimes that extend only “some” discretion to the agency with respect
to the trigger findings, interpreting “some” to mean de minimis. In
short, under this approach, the aggressive judicial reasoning seen
in cases like Karuk Tribe,392 Turtle Island,393 and National Resources
Defense Council v. Jewell394 would be the norm.
Although tightening down on agencies in this manner would not
eliminate the opportunity for negative space to creep in, it would
send a clear message to agencies that nondiscretion claims are high-
ly disfavored and will be excruciatingly difficult to mount in the
absence of unambiguously clear statutory language. This would
likely have deterred many of the losing nondiscretion claims we
have summarized,395 but this would have accepted meritorious
claims like those APHIS made regarding its decision not to consult
under the ESA when deregistering RRA.396
392. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 70-72, 215-21 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 147-58, 172-77, 201-06, 210-13, 215-21 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
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Of course, while this tightening down approach would go a long
way toward policing agency gaming behavior, its success relies upon
the support of every federal court which must get on board and stick
with the game plan. Home Builders certainly is no pep talk in that
respect, and even the Ninth Circuit has been unable to produce
unanimity for or against an aggressive policing approach—if
anything, its case law is in disarray.397 Moreover, the consequences
of this approach would be to expose agencies to a near constant
barrage of litigation over whether they must consult. As noted
above, more ESA and NEPA consultation does not necessarily
produce better decisions or more valuable information.398 The objec-
tive of solving the negative space problem should not be to maximize
ESA and NEPA consultation, but rather to optimize it. Overall,
therefore, the tightening down approach is unlikely to come about
as a practical matter, and even if it did, it is less than clear that it
would fulfill the purposes of the ESA and NEPA.
B. Smoothing—Discretion as a Dial
As it stands, ESA and NEPA implementation allows only a
limited range of administrative outcomes, each based on the level of
impact from the agency action, despite the vast universe of potential
agency actions. For example, though NEPA compliance has many
steps, there are, broadly, only three possible outcomes: a categorical
exclusion, an environmental assessment that leads to a finding of no
significant impact (known as a FONSI), or a full-blown EIS.399
Similarly, ESA consultation outcomes ramp up incrementally in
terms of impact from no effect to species jeopardization, with
additional assessment and process imposed at each incremental step
along the way.400 So, all agency actions must be squeezed into one
of just a few possible impact-based outcomes. Not surprisingly,
litigation under the ESA and NEPA is often directed at challenging
the stage at which the agency completed the process, with claims
involving whether an agency should have prepared an environmen-
tal impact statement rather than stopping at the environmental
397. See supra notes 33, 284-85 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 296-300 and accompanying text.
399. See supra Part I.B.
400. See supra Part I.A.
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assessment or whether the agency was mistaken that its action
would not affect species.401 The result is that an agency with only
a small discretionary handle in the matter faces the possibility of
full-blown assessment duties, which has contributed to agencies’
discretion aversion.
What if, however, the intensity of ESA and NEPA assessment
requirements could take into account not just the level of impact but
also the degree of agency discretion? Thinking of agency discretion
not as a toggle switch but as a dial of intensity could allow agencies
to match their discretionary skin in the game to the burden of ESA
and NEPA assessment. For example, instead of requiring EPA to
engage in full-blown ESA consultation between initial registration
and reregistration of pesticides when new species listings occur,402
this approach would allow EPA to make a quick assessment
whether deferring consultation until reregistration poses a signifi-
cant concern for the species. Similarly, if the only discretionary hook
an agency retains with respect to a permitted activity is a reopener
clause, a short memo entry in the permit file finding that some new
condition poses no significant concern would be enough. And if, as
Karuk Tribe requires, preliminary sorting decisions must nonethe-
less trigger the ESA and NEPA,403 let the agency handle the no-
impact applications by checking off a box on the application form.
This kind of smoothing out of the ESA and NEPA assessment
obligations based on the intensity of agency discretion could remove
much of the agency incentive to game nondiscretion claims, because
conceding that some discretion exists will not necessarily pour the
agency into the depths of the ESA and NEPA.
Negative space problems will persist, however, and new concerns
will arise. First, if litigation regarding the existing increments of
ESA and NEPA assessment burden based on intensity of impact is
any indication,404 coupling that system with increments based on
intensity of agency discretion invites only more litigation over
whether the agency correctly characterized its intensity of discre-
tion. Incentives will remain for agencies to argue their discretion
401. See cases cited supra Part II.
402. See supra notes 147-51, 336-38 and accompanying text.
403. See Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1027, 1029-30 (9th Cir.
2012).
404. See cases cited supra Part II.
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dials are set at lower intensity levels, and courts will be asked to
make the agency turn up the dial. Negative space will creep back in,
as it is likely courts and agencies will continue to disagree often.
Moreover, in some cases, the level of impact could be significant
while the level of discretion is low, in which case this proposal offers
no safe harbor for the agency—conceding some discretion could drag
the agency into full-blown ESA and NEPA assessments. Therefore,
overall, while this proposal moves closer to the heart of the problem
than does the tightening down approach, it is unlikely to work in
the long run. Whether it is switching a toggle or twiddling a dial,
the inevitability of litigation over the agency’s position will drive the
system toward mapping discretion’s negative space.
C. Decoupling—Discretion as the Wrong Question
We opened this Article with the observation that the applicability
of a number of administrative law doctrines hinges on the presence
or absence of agency discretion. The discretion/nondiscretion test
arguably serves as a proxy for the broad set of factors motivating
each of the doctrines.405 Yet, while that might justify the use of
discretion as the limit test for mandamus or tort immunity,406 we
have shown that it can lead to significant institutional concerns
when discretion is made the trigger for the ESA and NEPA.407
Hence, another possible remedy to the discretion aversion syndrome
is to altogether eliminate discretion as a factor for the ESA and
NEPA, completely reversing the tightening and smoothing ap-
proaches. We acknowledge this will be viewed as a radical approach,
but it is both legally permissible and, we believe, an effective way of
administering the statutes. Obviously, eliminating use of discretion
as a factor also completely removes the incentives for agencies to
make ESA and NEPA nondiscretion claims, avoiding the problems
that follow, as well as prevents the confusion that the ESA and
NEPA cases have caused from bleeding into the “good” discretion
doctrines.
405. See Rogers, supra note 1, at 834-35.
406. See id. at 776.
407. See supra Part III.
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1. Proposal
Neither the ESA nor NEPA include explicit statutory exemptions
for nondiscretionary actions.408 The statutes require that there be
only a proposed agency action, with neither the statutory texts nor
the legislative histories mentioning agency discretion as an addi-
tional requirement.409 From that statutory baseline, the key step in
our proposal requires the FWS, NMFS, and CEQ to promulgate
rules eliminating the respective nondiscretion exemptions. Both
actions are legally permissible under existing law, would be entitled
to Chevron deference, and should be deemed reasonable.
First, as for the ESA nondiscretion doctrine, FWS and NMFS
promulgated it by rule and the Court upheld it in Home Builders;410
importantly, however, Home Builders was a Chevron Step Two
case.411 The majority did not foreclose the possibility of other reason-
able interpretations, and thus the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of Chevron in National Cable and Telecommunications Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Services and subsequent cases allows FWS and
NMFS room to rethink the ESA side provided the agencies display
awareness of and show good reasons for a change in position.412 As
for the NEPA nondiscretion doctrine, CEQ has promulgated no rule
on point and the Court has yet to decide the question Justice
Marshall explicitly left open in Flint Ridge.413 Lower courts have
implied the NEPA nondiscretion exemption in the absence of a CEQ
rule but have never suggested, much less ruled, that CEQ is hand-
cuffed from engaging in a different reasoned administrative
interpretation.414 CEQ thus has room to rethink the NEPA side.
As the agencies responsible for administering the ESA and
NEPA, the FWS, NMFS, and CEQ rules would be entitled to
Chevron Step Two deference. The question thus boils down to
whether they could replace the (presumed) reasonable nondiscretion
408. See supra Part I.
409. See Weller, supra note 38, at 327-30. 
410. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 664, 666-67, 672 (2007);
supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
411. Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 665-66; supra note 388.
412. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2124-26 (2016); Nat’l Cable
& Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-84 (2005).
413. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
414. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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doctrine interpretations with an alternative reasonable interpreta-
tion based on the rationales we have spelled out. Indeed, we believe
our proposal set out below is an even more reasonable interpreta-
tion of the statutes.
We have demonstrated from our survey of the nondiscretion case
law that the rising tide of agency nondiscretion claims poses three
institutional concerns. Agency gaming and judicial incoherence
concerns flow from the use of discretion as the touchstone for
applying the ESA and NEPA,415 and the demotion of the statutes’
information-production function is the consequence of successful
nondiscretion claims.416 These perverse effects are eliminated entire-
ly by replacing the nondiscretion exemptions with the following
rules defining the scope of the respective agencies’ implementation
regulations based on the statutes’ purposes:
Scope: These regulations apply to any proposed agency action
not otherwise excluded by law if following their requirements is
reasonably likely to either:
(1) assist the agency in making an informed decision regard-
ing the action based on knowledge the assessment will provide
about the impacts of the action within the scope of assessment
required by these regulations, or
(2) provide Congress, state legislatures, federal agencies, state
agencies, private businesses and organizations, or a significant
number of private persons interested in the agency action
important information regarding the action and its impacts
within the scope of assessment required by these regulations
which otherwise (a) is not readily available to such entities or
persons at the time the agency proposes the action, or (b) will
not be provided by another agency’s assessment required under
subsection (1) before the impacts of the action are irreversible.
2. Virtues
Recognizing that this proposal is bound to raise some questions,
we initially discuss its virtues. The first condition zeroes in on what
the nondiscretion exemptions purportedly aim to achieve—improv-
ing agency decision-making—without all the baggage that comes
415. See supra Parts III.A-B.
416. See supra Part III.C.
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with the discretion-based tests. Its scope is both broader and nar-
rower than what the discretion-based tests have produced. The
proposal is broader in that it would put agency decisions up for
grabs, such as the EPA’s CWA state delegation for being an action
based on decisions the EPA makes about the statutory criteria.417
The proposal is narrower in that it clearly requires both an action
and an agency decision, such that the time between the EPA’s
initial registration and reregistration of pesticides would not trigger
the ESA or NEPA under this condition; the agency has not proposed
an action, and there is no decision-making process underway. The
result is that agency discretion no longer is of relevance. So long as
an agency is moving toward taking final agency action within the
meaning of the EPA, it is fair game for the ESA and NEPA. The
additional requirement that the assessment would “assist the agen-
cy in making an informed decision” allows agencies, like APHIS in
its noxious weed regulation program, to continue to avoid the ESA
under this condition, as APHIS’s statute makes clear nothing about
species impacts can assist in informing APHIS’s decision.418
The second condition introduces the information-production
function of the two statutes as an independent basis for requiring
assessment. This could result in a requirement that agencies, like
APHIS, must prepare ESA assessments even when they cannot take
species impacts into account in their decisions. The information
expected to be produced, however, must be “important” and either
“not otherwise readily available” to the other entities or not expect-
ed to be produced by another agency pursuant to the first condition.
For example, the potential impacts on species of farmers’ increased
glyphosate use after APHIS’s deregulation of Roundup Ready
Alfalfa likely would have been important information;419 however,
if some other agency with relevant expertise and decision-making
authority had already assessed the effects or will do so in a reason-
able time frame, APHIS need not.420 If the increased glyphosate use
417. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 163-71 and accompanying text.
419. See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d,
718 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2013).
420. In fact, following on the heels of court orders discussed above requiring the EPA to
consult under ESA section 7 regarding continued pesticide registrations, the EPA settled
other litigation with the Center for Biological Diversity in 2015 by agreeing to conduct
nationwide assessments of glyphosate use. See Endangered Species Litigation and Associated
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would jeopardize a species in violation of ESA section 7, and there
is no agency with authority to regulate glyphosate use to avoid such
a result, the ESA provides a procedure under which APHIS, and any
other agency contributing to the impacts, could seek an exemption
from the jeopardy prohibition on the basis that their statutory
authorities leave them “no reasonable and prudent alternatives to
the agency action.”421
The net result of the two triggering conditions of our proposal is
to prioritize assessment by the agencies actually making decisions
that could be meaningfully informed by knowledge about impacts of
the proposed action within the scope of the ESA and NEPA.
Therefore, the proposal fulfills the decision-improvement function
of the statutes, while simultaneously ensuring that the information-
production function of the statutes is advanced for all proposed
actions. Only when neither statutory function can be advanced will
the ESA or NEPA not be triggered for an agency’s proposed action.
Furthermore, decoupling the ESA and NEPA from a discretion-
based test does not injure the other discretion-based doctrines. A
finding that an agency has no discretion for purposes of the ESA
and NEPA, while not necessarily binding for purposes of the other
“good” doctrines, could be influential. Yet there is no inherent
reason to link the “good” with the “bad”—the purposes of the ESA
and NEPA have little to do with the purposes justifying the
mandamus shield, immunity doctrines, and judicial deference. The
result should be that a finding that an agency must complete ESA
or NEPA assessment for decision-improvement or information-
production purposes will not lock in or influence any finding
regarding the presence of discretion for the “good” discretion
doctrines. For example, under this approach Home Builders would
Pesticide Limitations, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/endangered-species/endangered-species-
litigation-and-associated-pesticide-limitations [https://perma.cc/URE6-XSKG] (last updated
June 22, 2016). Under our proposal, APHIS could point to its limited scope of decision criteria
for concluding consultation would not improve its decision process, and to EPA’s consultation
for concluding that any important information will be provided by an agency with appropriate
expertise and authority.
421. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(i) (2012). Justice Stevens pointed to this procedure in Home
Builders as a reason why the CWA and ESA do not irreconcilably conflict and as evidence that
Congress intended the potential extinction of a species to override nondiscretionary mandates.
See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 687-88, 67 n.10 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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have come out the other way: the EPA must consult—as indeed it
used to—to explore how different state program designs play out
under the ESA, so in the future it could steer states in that direc-
tion; the decision to approve delegation once the CWA criteria are
met would nonetheless remain nondiscretionary for purposes of the
other discretion doctrines.
3. Objections
We have no delusions that our proposal is free from its own set of
concerns. One objection certainly will be that it will fuel litigation
over the key concepts, such as the meaning of “assist,” “informed,”
and “readily available.” As with any new agency rule that introduces
substantive terms to the agency’s program, our solution will not be
litigation free. However, under our proposal the litigation would be
over the meaning of terms that actually matter to fulfilling the
purposes of the ESA and NEPA rather than bickering over esoteric
theories and nuances of agency discretion. Moreover, the FWS,
NMFS, and CEQ can provide definitions of the key terms, spelling
out the factors agencies and courts can weigh in their determina-
tions. Over time, a body of agency policy, practice, and judicial
review will clarify and stabilize the provision’s implementation, a
state the agencies and courts seem nowhere close to reaching under
the nondiscretion doctrines.
We also expect objections based on which agencies are put under
the thumb of the ESA and NEPA and which are let off the hook
relative to how the nondiscretion doctrines’ case law allocated that
dichotomy. We agree that a reshuffling is likely to occur. But if the
statutes’ purposes drive the reshuffling of which agencies receive
more or less oversight under our proposal, instead of a determina-
tion based on agency and judicial conceptions of agency discretion,
we find that to be an improvement on the status quo. If APHIS has
to consult under the ESA because the consequences of its deregula-
tion of RRA is an important matter to Congress or the public and no
other agency is looking at the impacts, so be it.422 If EPA does not
need to consult between its FIFRA registration and reregistration
decisions because doing so advances neither statutory goal, so be
422. See supra notes 163-71 and accompanying text.
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it.423 The objective of our proposal is not to maximize or minimize
agency ESA and NEPA burdens but rather to align them with the
statutes’ purposes. That our proposal might sweep in some agency
actions not subject to the ESA or NEPA under the nondiscretion
doctrines, or leave out others that would have been covered, simply
reflects that we view both the agency action requirement and the
goal of fulfilling statutory purposes seriously.
Finally, there is the question whether our proposal can make it
through the agencies and the courts and survive Congress’s
scrutiny. It is worth noting that we put Congress at the end of that
question rather than at the beginning. Putting our proposal into
action does not require a legislative fix. The ESA and NEPA apply
on their face to all proposed federal agency actions, but neither the
ESA nor NEPA has been interpreted as requiring the nondiscretion
exemption. Hence, so long as our proposed interpretation of the
statutes is reasonable, Congress need only avoid legislating our
proposal into oblivion. For the above reasons, we evaluate the
agencies, courts, and Congress in that order.
As for the agencies, we concede that the FWS, NMFS, and CEQ
appear to be comfortable with the status quo. However, unless the
agencies are not paying attention, it must be apparent that the
nondiscretion exemptions generate disarray in the agencies and the
courts.424 We have no evidence that anything like our analysis of the
status quo or our proposal for improving upon it has been presented
to, or considered by, the agencies. From there, the question becomes
whether it is realistic to believe that the agencies might adopt our
proposal. We do not profess to know how to read those tea leaves.
We do point out, however, that the ESA nondiscretion doctrine was
the product of an administration openly hostile to the ESA.425 We
see no reason to believe that an Administration openly supportive
of the ESA and NEPA could not envision our proposal as consistent
with its agenda.
Assuming the agencies were to adopt our proposal, the courts
would look to present administrative law doctrine to determine
423. See supra notes 147-51, 336-38 and accompanying text.
424. See supra Parts III.A-B.
425. See STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 24-25 (2001)
(recounting the history of the ESA and noting the hostility of then Secretary of the Interior
James Watt to the ESA).
180 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:97
whether the proposal is a reasonable interpretation of the statutes
within the meaning of the Chevron Step Two test.426 Anticipating
that challenge, we designed our proposal to hue very closely to
operationalizing the statutes’ purposes. To find our proposal im-
permissible under the ESA or NEPA, a court would have to conclude
that advancing both the decision-improvement and information-
production purposes of the statute is unreasonable. We contend that
such a finding would be untenable. Of course, the skeptics that
ultimately matter would be the Justices of the Supreme Court. We
do not profess to know how to read those tea leaves, either. We do
point out, however, that Home Builders was a 5-4 decision with a
robust dissent, and the majority unequivocally framed the question
as a Chevron Step Two analysis.427 If the agencies were to adopt our
proposal through legislative rulemaking, it is not implausible to
believe the courts would accept it, albeit in some cases grudgingly.
As far as reading the tea leaves of Congress goes, those are the
most inscrutable. Republican and Democratic administrations alike
have been tinkering with the ESA and NEPA implementation
regulations for the past two decades with no instance of legislative
override.428 Moreover, our proposal results only in a reshuffling of
which agency programs at the margins are and are not subject to
the ESA and NEPA, rather than the kind of across the board expan-
sion or contraction of coverage more likely to attract Congress’s
attention. If Congress has an interest in protecting a particular
agency from the ESA and NEPA assessment burdens our proposal
imposes, it can enact targeted carve-outs as it has in the past for the
military.429 Ultimately, therefore, our proposal stands a realistic
chance of surviving the courts and Congress, if the FWS, NMFS,
and CEQ put it into action.
426. See, e.g., Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 665 (relying on Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
427. See id. at 666.
428. See J.B. Ruhl, Does Congress Exist?, 30 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 79, 83-85 (2014)
(recounting extensive administrative policy reform beginning in 1994 in the absence of
congressional override).
429. See id. at 86 (discussing military exemptions).
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CONCLUSION
At first blush, the either-or, discretion-or-not approach applied by
agencies and courts to nondiscretion claims makes sense. But upon
closer examination and when subjected to real-world application
through the ESA and NEPA nondiscretion cases, this binary system
unravels and becomes nearly impossible to administer in a consis-
tent fashion. Each facet of discretion’s negative space injected by the
ESA and NEPA case law complicates the temporal, spatial, and
institutional dimensions of discretion, to the point that what is
supposed to be a straightforward inquiry has transformed into an
unwieldy, byzantine doctrine the courts seem incapable of manag-
ing.
This is no narrow specialist’s problem of environmental law. The
ESA and NEPA capture all actions federal agencies authorize, fund,
or carry out, except (for now) actions over which the agency has no
discretion or control. That is no small universe of actions, and as
climate change makes more and more agency programs potential
sources of injury to protected species and the environment, that
universe only grows larger. If the nondiscretion exemption battles
now in full force on the Ninth Circuit are any indication, the de-
veloping jurisprudence of the ESA and NEPA nondiscretion
exemptions does not bode well for a smooth incorporation of those
programs into its space.
We propose a simpler way forward. By discarding the ESA and
NEPA discretion exemptions and replacing them with an analysis
grounded in the statutes’ purposes, our approach forces agencies to
stay true to congressional intent, allows agencies to avail them-
selves of the “good” discretion doctrines without worry, and relieves
courts and agencies from the burden and uncertainty of navigating
the discretion doctrines’ system. While our proposed approach will
certainly invite litigation over the meaning of certain terms and
implementation, the lawsuits will turn on questions related to ESA
and NEPA statutory purposes, not on the scope or pertinence of
agency discretion. We will happily take that over the growing
morass of discretion aversion litigation that clogs courts today.
